



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**HOW SHOULD MUNICIPAL POLICE AGENCIES  
PARTICIPATE IN AMERICA'S HOMELAND SECURITY  
STRATEGY?**

by

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December 2008

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**HOW SHOULD MUNICIPAL POLICE AGENCIES PARTICIPATE IN  
AMERICA'S HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY?**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The majority of municipal law enforcement agencies in the United States are not proactively contributing to America's homeland security, counterterrorism or domestic intelligence efforts. These agencies – the country's most critical domestic security assets – sit idle on the homeland security sidelines as terrorism becomes increasingly prolific, lethal, asymmetric, transnational, and closer to our hometowns.

Seven years after 9/11, there is no nationwide, municipal-level network of homeland security professionals across the United States. There is no preventative-based, forward-thinking system for domestic intelligence collection. And, the vast majority of police departments lack homeland security or terrorism specialists. Furthermore, neither federal nor state strategy has clearly defined specific homeland security roles and responsibilities for municipal police departments.

And, as of this writing, there is no municipal-level homeland security strategy. Most importantly, no realistic federal or state strategy has been put forth that integrates all of America's homeland security assets—including municipal police officers - into a single synergistic design.

This thesis examines three policy options and arrives at a conclusion as to which option America should implement to effectively protect our citizenry from terrorists. This thesis introduces the concept of “municipal homeland security” and defines the specific roles and responsibilities of municipal police agencies.

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Essayons!

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# **I. INTRODUCTION**

## **A. PROBLEM STATEMENT**

“Today, our nation is safer, but we’re not yet safe”<sup>1</sup> Consider this: The majority of municipal law enforcement officers in the United States are not proactively contributing to America’s homeland security, counterterrorism or domestic intelligence efforts. These officers – the country’s most critical domestic security assets – sit idle on the homeland security sidelines as terrorism becomes increasingly prolific, lethal, asymmetric, transnational, and closer to our hometowns.

Today, more than seven years after 9/11, there is no municipal-level network of homeland security professionals, no preventative-based forward-thinking system for domestic intelligence collection, few homeland security or terrorism specialists in the majority of police departments, and most importantly, no (realistic) strategy to integrate all of America’s homeland security assets into a single synergistic design that is based upon the local community. The federal government continues to emphasize a decidedly federal approach to homeland security.

On 9/11, the American public witnessed a new phenomenon – transnational religious fanaticism expressed through the synchronized exploitation of a modern network, specifically the transportation network. On that day, al Qaeda (an asymmetric threat) deliberately and successfully attacked the United States of America by converting commercial airplanes into weapons of mass destruction. And, they intend to strike us again “...and just as you lay waste to our nation, so shall we lay waste to yours”<sup>2</sup>

The events of 9/11 caused an epiphany in America’s government, intelligence, military and law enforcement communities. Following the attacks, leaders in each of these critical areas became engrossed in self-evaluation as they rushed to create new

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<sup>1</sup> National Strategy for Homeland Security, October 5, 2007, President’s Letter, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/homeland/nshs/2007/letter.html> (accessed November 17, 2008).

<sup>2</sup> Gillis Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, *Al Qaeda in its Own Words* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008).

intelligence, defense, and law enforcement strategies independently. Subsequently, new and innovative legislation was enacted, new governmental agencies emerged, major reorganizations of existing government agencies transpired, thousands of homeland security workers were hired, new intelligence protocols were established and the law enforcement community took on new responsibilities. These were significant undertakings in our American society. Yet, no individual, public official or government agency – at any level of government – has formalized a national plan that fully integrates municipalities and the municipal law enforcement community into the country’s homeland security strategy. America has both national and state homeland security strategies, but lacks a critical component – a municipal-level homeland security strategy.

As a result, a false sense of security exists within America, as our communities are needlessly exposed to transnational and domestic terrorists and other malcontents. This deplorable and completely unacceptable state of homeland security does not stem from the problems of a decentralized police profession or the lack of federal guidance alone, but rather from a number of mutually supporting factors. These factors are:

- 1. The National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) Lacks Specificity**

The NSHS lacks specificity for the municipal police community. The NSHS, as it currently exists, is primarily a broad, overarching federal strategy rather than a comprehensive national strategy. The role of municipal police agencies in the NSHS (or any national strategy) is not clearly identified and defined; subsequently little federal guidance is provided to municipal police leaders as to how their agencies can integrate and proactively participate in America’s domestic security.

- 2. The American Way of Policing Is Decentralized**

America is a federated republic; every state is entitled to establish its own executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. This same autonomy exists within the American way of policing. Across the United States there are approximately

17,876 police agencies representing approximately 836,737 sworn officers.<sup>3</sup> The “current system of policing is individualized, fragmented and disconnected”<sup>4</sup> In America, there is a “... multitude of police forces in any state and the varying standards of organization and services have contributed immeasurably to the general low grade of police performance in this country”<sup>5</sup> The decentralization of American policing makes it difficult for implementation of a comprehensive domestic security strategy. Subsequently, the majority of police executives continue to operate their departments as they see fit, largely ignoring the needs of modern America.

### **3. Emerging Anti-Terrorism Programs Compound and Continue the Decentralization Problem**

In the days following September 11, some local anti-terrorism efforts began to slowly emerge, primarily due to an information, resource and guidance void that was not filled by federal and state governments. As the more proactive police leaders realized they were largely on their own, the need for self-protection became apparent. Subsequently, various anti-terrorism programs were created, each a little different from the other, but all designed to accomplish one goal – to protect only the individual community.

The emergence of individualized anti-terrorism programs (in some cases homeland security programs) compounds the problem of decentralization and creates further discontinuity and fragmentation within America’s homeland security strategy. When numerous local homeland security programs are formed – and more will be formed after the next attack on the homeland – we continue and compound these problems, thereby limiting our own ability to protect ourselves.

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<sup>3</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics website, [www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm](http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm) (accessed October 15, 2008).

<sup>4</sup> Christopher Vicino, *Building a Better Mouse Trap: Increasing Counterterrorism Capabilities through Consolidation*, (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, U.S. Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Monterey, California 2006).

<sup>5</sup> National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement. *Wickersham Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933).

Without a unifying collaborative approach to homeland security, we are destined to repeat the failures experienced in the war on drugs. According to the U.S. Conference of Mayors “Drug-related crimes were cited most frequently by the survey cities as their single biggest crime problem”<sup>6</sup> At the municipal level, America’s approach to combat drugs is similar to the approach being used to combat terrorism. In the war on drugs, every municipal police department is free to develop (or not develop) its own anti-drug strategy. Like the homeland security strategy, there is no unifying national drug strategy. Subsequently, the illegal drug trade flourishes in America as illegal drugs saturate every aspect of our society. In the war on drugs, a decentralized approach has proven disastrous – we need not make the same mistake in homeland security. Without a unifying national plan, drug dealers and terrorists propagate.

#### **4. Long-Standing Methodologies and Practices Remain Prominent**

The lack of federal guidance – compounded by the propensity of many municipal police chiefs to accept the status quo – creates an atmosphere where long-standing practices and methodologies are memorialized. Most police departments cling to traditional policing models that are decentralized and reactive, not proactive; consider response a priority, not prevention; and fail to address 21<sup>st</sup> century threats such as asymmetric terrorism. Why upset the apple cart? Especially when the department is operating relatively smoothly and the community appears secure from terrorists.

These police leaders do not fully comprehend the threat of terrorism or the significant positions their agencies can occupy in America’s homeland security strategy. They continue to go about their daily lives, concentrating on traditional crime, as if they – and their communities – are uniquely immune from terrorists and their lethal schemes.

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<sup>6</sup> The United States Conference of Mayors, 2008 Economic Downturn and Federal Inaction Impact on Crime, Philadelphia (August 6, 2008), [www.usmayors.org/maf/documents/CrimeReport\\_0808.pdf](http://www.usmayors.org/maf/documents/CrimeReport_0808.pdf) (accessed November 17, 2008).

## **5. Terrorism Is Not Perceived As a Real Threat**

Most in the law enforcement community have neither lived in a society where terrorism occurs frequently, nor have they ever been exposed to terrorism. Many police leaders were born, raised, attended school and now raise their own families in the communities where they are employed. Terrorism is not real to these officers. It is the old “it could never happen here” adage. Terrorism will not be taken seriously until municipal police officers understand the dynamics of terrorism and that terrorism is a viable threat to their community.

## **6. There are Three Levels of Government and Two Levels of Homeland Security Strategy**

In the United States, there is both national and state homeland security strategy. However, there is no municipal-level homeland security strategy. National strategy broadly focuses on guiding and unifying our nation’s homeland security assets.<sup>7</sup> State strategy concentrates on a state’s plan to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism.<sup>8</sup> The missing component is a foundational level of homeland strategy that is specific to municipalities.

The lack of municipal homeland security strategy leaves many municipalities vulnerable and open to attack.

## **7. The Municipal Homeland Security Mission Is Not Widely Accepted**

The majority of police agencies in America do not have anyone assigned (either in a full-time or part-time basis) to homeland security or antiterrorism duties. There are few police specialists in these two important fields. In most departments, no one is specifically trained to recognize terrorism indicators or investigate terrorism-related incidents. In addition, no one is proactively scouring police reports, public documents, or

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<sup>7</sup> See the version for more information regarding national homeland security direction. The National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2007, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book> (accessed November 17, 2008).

<sup>8</sup> California State Homeland Security Strategy, 2007, [www.homeland.ca.gov/pdf/2008\\_CA\\_State\\_Homeland\\_Security\\_Strategy](http://www.homeland.ca.gov/pdf/2008_CA_State_Homeland_Security_Strategy) (accessed November 1, 2008).

the community for information that could be utilized to better secure their community. Relationships with federal and state terrorism officers are not routinely established, community anti-terrorism partnerships are not being created, and managers of infrastructure are still on their own when it comes to securing their facilities against terrorists. The absence of police terrorism and homeland security professionals and the aforementioned proactive efforts clearly indicates the homeland security mission is not yet considered a core police mission at the local level.

## **B. RESEARCH QUESTION**

This thesis examines three homeland security policy options for the municipal police community. It focuses on the current and future roles of municipal police organizations in the nation's Homeland Security Strategy. It investigates the benefit of creating and implementing a new homeland security approach, one that is based upon a collaborative, synergistic, community-level, homeland security construct that places the municipal police community at the forefront of America's domestic security efforts.

The principle research question is: How should municipal police agencies participate in America's homeland security?

## **C. METHODOLOGY**

In an effort to protect the country from terrorism the federal government has published a number of domestic security-related documents; there are National Strategies (NSs), Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs), National Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs), National Preparedness Goals, and as of January 2008, there is a National Response Framework (NRF) – and there are many more. These important national documents originate from several presidential administrations and seek to provide guidance and direction to a wide spectrum of homeland security entities. Yet, none provides the municipal police community with specific homeland security-related direction and guidelines.

This research seeks to fill that void. It seeks to identify what the homeland security roles, responsibilities and expectations are for municipal police departments by interviewing homeland security professionals, examining current homeland security, counterterrorism and intelligence initiatives and by conducting a comprehensive literature review. Through the course of this research, eleven critical elements (called imperatives) have been identified. Imperatives are elements that must be present in order for a strategy or policy option (alternative) to be successful at the municipal police level.

Utilizing policy options analysis methodology three homeland security alternatives for the municipal police community are examined and contrasted. The ultimate goal of this methodology is to identify the smartest homeland security methodology for the municipal police community – and broader America.

#### **D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH**

This research will expose and examine America's current (and needless) vulnerability to transnational, domestic and asymmetric terrorism. It also exposes the problems of domestic intelligence collection, and the reasons why the vast majority of municipal police agencies play only minor and peripheral roles in our nation's homeland security. It will add significantly to the national debate as to whether municipal police agencies can have a positive – even critical role – in domestic security. This research project will go beyond the typical homeland security “general recommendations” that are so prolific in our national strategies, and actually propose specific homeland security roles, responsibilities and methodologies for the municipal police community and local citizenry.

This research will provide America's homeland security policy writers, police executives, and state administrators with a new and unique homeland security strategy that incorporates all of the country's homeland security assets into a collaborative framework.

It is this writer's hope that this research will have a profound effect on our homeland security philosophy, municipal police community, and the manner in which America implements its homeland security strategy.

## **E. AUDIENCE**

This research is intended for the Department of Homeland Security and the municipal police community. It is relevant to all levels of government, academia, and to professional law enforcement organizations such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). It is intended to be applicable to a broad spectrum of governmental, community, and homeland security entities, such as fire and health departments, public and private security agencies, business and infrastructure executives, and community stakeholders.

## **F. CHAPTER OUTLINES**

### **1. Chapter II – Literature Review**

The literature review examines the homeland security literature field for specific guidance relative to the municipal police community. Municipal police executives must know what is expected of their departments regarding the domestic security front. To this end, this review examines whether or not police executives have received the necessary specific homeland security guidance to protect effectively their communities—and our country – from terrorism.

### **2. Chapter III – Evidence**

Using New England as an example, this chapter provides the evidence that supports the assertion that most municipal police departments are not proactively participating in America's homeland security strategy. This researcher contacted the U.S. Attorney's Office in each of the six New England states and asked either the Anti-Terrorism Coordinator or the Intelligence Research Specialist how many municipal police departments in their state have a sworn officer on staff assigned to homeland security or anti-terrorism responsibilities. Shockingly, very few municipal police departments have someone on staff that is responsible for protecting the community from terrorism.

### **3. Chapter IV – Imperatives and Policy Options**

This chapter describes the imperatives used to assess each of the three policy options presented in this research. A detailed description of the imperatives is provided. Each imperative is considered an essential component of a municipal-level homeland security strategy and has direct utility for municipalities and municipal law enforcement agencies.

There are three homeland security policy options (alternatives) that America can adopt: (1) continue with the status quo; (2) expand current homeland security programs to fit a national scale; or (3) implement a new homeland security strategy. This chapter describes each option and lays the foundation for a comparative analysis.

### **4. Chapter V – Analysis**

This chapter explains the analysis conducted for this project. In this chapter, each policy option is compared against the aforementioned imperatives. And, each option is compared against the other options. By conducting the analysis in this fashion, the strengths and weaknesses of each option are exposed and a preferred solution to America's homeland security dilemma is revealed.

### **5. Chapter VI – Local Homeland Security Strategy (MHSS)**

This chapter provides the reader with a detailed explanation of the preferred solution, the Municipal Homeland Security Strategy (MHSS). It introduces the reader to a new, collaborative approach to homeland security and the concept of municipal homeland security. The MHSS is a new and innovative approach of protecting the local community from terrorism. It is a collaborative strategy that integrates all of America's homeland security assets into a networked, synergistic design.

### **6. Chapter VII – Homeland Security Officers (MHSOs) and Community Homeland Security Officers (CHSOs)**

Chapter VII introduces the reader to the municipal homeland security officer (MHSO) and the community homeland security officer (CHSO). The MHSO and the

CHSO are jointly responsible for securing their communities from terrorism and catastrophic accident. These officers are vital to the municipal homeland security strategy, as they partner to lead their community's homeland security efforts. These officers coordinate and manage all aspects of the Community Protection Plan for their respective community.

The MHSO is appointed by the local police chief (from the ranks of sworn personnel) and serves his or her community as the resident expert on all matters relative to homeland security. The CHSO is appointed by the local administrator (mayor, town manager, etc.) from the local government's staff and serves as the administration's connection to the community's homeland security efforts.

## **7. Chapter VIII – Municipal Homeland Security Network (MHSN)**

The municipal homeland security network (MHSN) is the domestic information and intelligence collection and dissemination mechanism for the MHSS. The network is comprised of MHSOs and any other federal, state or local individual or group that can contribute to a region's security. Presently in America, there is no such mechanism or entity at the community level. The MHSN fills this void. This chapter provides a detailed explanation of the MHSN, its composition, methodology and the products it produces.

## **8. Chapter IX – Strategy Implementation and Conclusion**

The final chapter in this research describes a specific approach to strategy implementation and makes specific recommendations toward that end. It also provides the reader with the project's conclusion.

## **II. LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **A. LITERATURE REVIEW**

The purpose of this review is to examine the current state of existing literature relative to the role municipal police departments play in our nation's homeland security strategy. Specifically, this review sought to determine whether or not the municipal police community has been provided the necessary guidance, roles and responsibilities to integrate into either national or state strategy.

The literature in the homeland security field is vast and encompasses nearly every topic, ranging from foreign terrorist organizations to neighborhood watch programs. Therefore, I separated this massive field of literature into smaller, more manageable sub-literatures. These include national documents; state strategies; literature produced by professional law enforcement organizations such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF).

The 9/11 Commission Report noted, "Those attacks showed, emphatically, that ways of doing business rooted in a different era are not good enough. Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system designed generations ago for a world that no longer exists."<sup>9</sup> America must move beyond a response-oriented mindset and begin concentrating on prevention. Prevention and collaborative action are the necessary ingredients for a secure America. Therefore, the national strategies and other national documents were examined explicitly for standardized, preventative-based guidelines relative to the municipal police community.

This review does not conduct an evaluation of the overall effectiveness of any national or state strategy, nor is it concerned with post-event response-oriented procedures. This review seeks to answer the following questions: What are the specific roles and responsibilities for municipal police agencies in America's homeland security

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<sup>9</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Acts Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004).

strategy? What expectations does the federal government have for municipal police departments in the areas of homeland security, counterterrorism, domestic intelligence collection and infrastructure protection? And, is there a standardized, preventative-based national framework that unifies all of America's police assets against terrorism?

This review will demonstrate that there is relatively little written on the specific responsibilities municipal police departments have in our nation's homeland security strategy. This discovery is not surprising. After all, homeland security is a new and complex paradigm for police executives and political leaders. Professor Christopher Bellavita of the Naval Postgraduate School put it this way: "Preventing terrorism is a new role for public safety agencies. They are used to responding to daily emergencies, not stopping acts of war."<sup>10</sup> The gaps in this literature field reflect the newness of the homeland security mission and should serve as a warning for America.

## **1. The National Approach**

As a starting point, one might ask why the federal government should be expected to provide the municipal police community with anti-terrorism and homeland security-related guidance. The answer is found in the following excerpt from a 2004 General Accounting Office report: "These strategies represent the administration's guidance to the federal, state, local, private, and international sectors, for combating terrorism and securing the homeland and, equally important, for sustaining efforts into the future."<sup>11</sup>

Throughout its existence, the federal government has gained invaluable experience at confronting terrorism through "...political, diplomatic, legal, law enforcement, and military means."<sup>12</sup> The government must translate this experience into strategic vision, mission and goals for state and local governments, and every level of law enforcement. It must provide direction to these entities with clear articulation. In a

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<sup>10</sup> Christopher Bellavita, "What is Preventing Homeland Security?" *Homeland Security Affairs* 1, no. 1, art. 3, (2005).

<sup>11</sup> United States General Accounting Office Report, *Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism*, 2004, [www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-408T](http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-408T) (accessed November 3, 2008).

<sup>12</sup> Doron Zimmerman and Andreas Wenger, ed. *How States Fight Terrorism, Policy Dynamics in the West* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007).

world containing weapons of mass destruction and emerging asymmetric terrorism, it is not practical to assume the municipal police community has the expertise to construct effective countermeasures to such threats – especially, when it has only limited and occasional experience in this field.

The good news is that the federal government has done an admirable job of providing America with broad overarching vision, particularly in the area of the national strategies. The strategies outline the nation’s vision and goals on such topics as combating terrorism, infrastructure protection, weapons of mass destruction, cyberspace, money laundering, national security, and homeland security.

“These strategies are national in scope, cutting across levels of government and sectors and involving a large number of organizations and entities (i.e., the federal, state, local, and private sectors). In addition, national strategies frequently have international components, and they may be part of a structure of overlapping or supporting national strategies. Furthermore, the federal government does not control many of the sectors, organizations, entities, and resources involved in implementing the national strategies.”<sup>13</sup>

The bad news is there is not a single national document that provides the necessary guidance, roles and responsibilities to mobilize the law enforcement community into a unified national effort. The National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) is the primary national strategy that should provide these elements and orchestrate the efforts of America’s various law enforcement communities – but it does not. The NSHS states, “The purpose of strategy is to guide, organize, and unify our Nation’s homeland security efforts.”<sup>14</sup> Yet, seven years after 9/11, the majority of municipal police departments have not received the necessary guidance to “organize and unify.” Every municipal-level homeland security program in existence was originated by proactive police leaders who took matters into their own hands. There is no government-led unification of the country’s law enforcement assets – especially at the municipal level.

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<sup>13</sup> GAO Report, Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism.

<sup>14</sup> National Strategy for Homeland Security.

In fact, there are only a few options available for municipal police agencies to participate in national (preventative-based) homeland security efforts. Police executives can send a representative to their state's monthly Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) meeting or they can assign a police officer to the nearest FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). However, neither of these options is designed to provide the municipal police community with specific operational guidelines, roles or responsibilities in the area of homeland security. And, neither option was orchestrated by national strategy.

The NSHS goes on to state, "The Federal Government also is responsible for developing national strategies as well as promulgating best practices, national standards for homeland security, and national plans, as appropriate."<sup>15</sup> But, municipal police-related best practices and national standards cannot be found within the pages of the NSHS or any national document. On page thirty-three of the recently updated NSHS, there is a section entitled "Roles and Responsibilities." Surprisingly, this section is solely dedicated to incident response – not prevention. Overall, the NSHS is not an effective strategy for the municipal police community.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) is another document where one would expect to find specific guidance for the municipal police community. This strategy "...provides a broad framework for strengthening the U.S. security in the future. It identifies the national security goals of the United States, describes the foreign policy and military capabilities necessary to achieve those goals, evaluates the current status of these capabilities, and explains how national power will be structured to utilize these capabilities."<sup>16</sup> This thesis asserts that the municipal police community is a vital component of the broad framework the NSS describes. Therefore, national strategy must provide relative guidance to the police community – or the framework is not complete.

The NSS states "A government has no higher obligation than to protect the lives and livelihoods of its citizens. The hard core of the terrorists cannot be deterred or

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<sup>15</sup> The National Strategy for Homeland Security.

<sup>16</sup> GAO Report, Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism.

reformed; they must be tracked down, killed, or captured. They must be cut off from the network of individuals and institutions on which they depend for support. That network must in turn be deterred, disrupted, and disabled by using a broad range of tools.”<sup>17</sup> America’s municipal law enforcement community is a tool that should be effectively utilized in America’s national security, but it is not included in this strategy. The NSS focuses on building international action and bringing the fight to the enemies of America wherever they may be. The enemies of America have been inside America before; it is safe to assume they will be here again. Therefore, it makes sense to layer our national strategy and include the municipal police community in that effort.

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) is the third national strategy where the municipal police community should find guidance. This strategy “...elaborates on the terrorism aspects of the National Security Strategy by expounding on the need to destroy terrorist organizations, win the “war of ideas,” and strengthen security at home and abroad.”<sup>18</sup> Strengthening security at home is exactly what the country needs and it must be accomplished through unifying strategy.

Therefore, one expects to find standardization and a detailed plan of action that works toward that end, but, similar to the NSHS and NSS, there is relatively little in this strategy for non-federal law enforcement. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism simply does not provide America’s municipal police agencies with the necessary guidance to combat terrorism in their communities.

There is hope, however, and evidence the federal government is beginning to recognize the importance of providing guiding principles and specific responsibilities to entities below the federal level. In March 2008, the federal government replaced the National Response Plan (NRP) with the National Response Framework (NRF). “The National Response Framework (NRF) presents the guiding principles that enable all

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<sup>17</sup> The National Security Strategy, 2006, [www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006](http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006) (accessed November 17, 2008).

<sup>18</sup> Government Accounting Office Report, Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, 5.

response partners to prepare for and provide a unified national response to disasters and emergencies. It establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response.”<sup>19</sup>

Hopefully, this is the beginning of a trend. By providing guiding principles to emergency responders, the government is setting a minimum standard and unifying action in this critical area. Hopefully, the government will take similar steps on the prevention-side and implement prevention-oriented guiding principles for America’s most prolific homeland security asset – the municipal police community.

## **2. State Homeland Security Strategies (SHSS)**

The second body of literature relevant to this research is the state strategies. The California, Arizona, Texas and Massachusetts state strategies were examined. These states were selected based on the following criteria: population size, significant state and national infrastructure, important national resources, vital coastal borders, and commercial maritime ports (except Arizona). The Texas and California state strategies were also selected because each has extensive experience at responding to catastrophic disasters. As previously stated, this review is not intended to determine the overall quality of each strategy. Rather, the intent is to determine if each state has defined homeland security roles for municipal police agencies and developed a plan to integrate those agencies into a state-wide, preventative-based collaborative framework.

A common deficiency in the state strategies is the absence of municipal police roles and responsibilities. After reading a state strategy, this researcher was often left asking, “What role does a municipal police department play in the state’s homeland security strategy?” and, “What does a municipal police homeland security program look like?” One would think state homeland security strategies would describe with great detail the steps municipal police departments must take in this regard. They do not.

The research shows that state strategies, similar to their national counterparts, are admirable starting points and provide broad strategic guidance. “The State Strategy

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<sup>19</sup> Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, [http://www.dhs.gov/xprepresp/committees/editorial\\_0566.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/xprepresp/committees/editorial_0566.shtm) (accessed October 15, 2008).

provides the general framework for all homeland security efforts...”<sup>20</sup> The Arizona and Massachusetts strategies follow a similar approach – broad guidance. The California strategy is also broad in scope, but unlike the other strategies, it contains sections where police executives can find specific municipal police-related guidance.

Of all the strategies reviewed, the California strategy offers the most comprehensive plan for municipal police executives – particularly in the area of intelligence collection. In California, there is a State Terrorism Threat Assessment System (STTAS), a State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (STTAC) and four Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers (RTTACs). The STTAS “is a collaborative effort to gather and analyze information, employ cutting-edge analytical tools and methodologies to produce and share timely and actionable Homeland Security information between agencies and across the full range of public safety disciplines.”<sup>21</sup> The STTAC provides state-wide threat assessment capabilities while the RTTACs provide regional assessment capabilities.

How does the California intelligence system relate to the specific responsibilities of municipal police executives? The primary method is through collection. The assessment centers in California are only as good as the information they receive from the field. Therefore, there must be a mechanism to collect and feed information to the RTTACS. This is where the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program becomes important. TLOs are specially trained terrorism officers who identify, collect and disseminate terrorism-related materials. TLOs review police reports, collaborate with community leaders and serve as the primary collection agents at the local level. Police executives appoint TLOs to staff and thereby integrate with the state’s intelligence system.

In an effort to increase domestic collection, California’s strategy is to “enhance and expand the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program to include officers representing

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<sup>20</sup> The Texas State Homeland Security Strategic Plan 2005-2010, [www.governor.state.tx.us/files/homeland/HmLndSecurity\\_StratPlan.pdf](http://www.governor.state.tx.us/files/homeland/HmLndSecurity_StratPlan.pdf) (accessed April 15, 2008).

<sup>21</sup> The California State Homeland Security Strategy, [www.homeland.ca.gov/pdf/2008\\_CA\\_State\\_Homeland\\_Security\\_Strategy.pdf](http://www.homeland.ca.gov/pdf/2008_CA_State_Homeland_Security_Strategy.pdf) (accessed January 13, 2008).

Law Enforcement, Public Safety, State Agencies, and Private Security Firms”<sup>22</sup> In terms of collection, municipal police leaders understand that if they want to proactively contribute to the state’s intelligence system, they need to appoint a TLO to staff. California intends to support this objective by expanding a TLO training course for police officers, sheriffs and other participants.

Arizona also utilizes TLOs, but does not have as detailed a plan as California. The other two states in this review base domestic intelligence collection on serendipitous chance encounters and haphazard circumstance. In these states, if a police officer becomes aware of a suspicious incident, he or she is to report that incident to the state’s fusion center. This approach is response oriented and does not integrate police departments into the intelligence system. “Collection is the bedrock of intelligence.”<sup>23</sup> Without collection, the analysis and dissemination aspects are mute.

The Massachusetts intelligence strategy is based on the state’s 24/7 fusion center. “The operational and organizational “hub” of the Commonwealth’s homeland security efforts will be a 24/7 information fusion center maintained by the Massachusetts State Police Criminal Intelligence Section (Fusion Center).”<sup>24</sup> Fusion centers do not have the personnel, expertise, and in most cases, the authority to go into the communities and collect information. Most analysts are non-sworn, civilian employees. The strategy’s focus on the fusion center, rather than a comprehensive collection strategy, leaves most police chiefs wondering how they can participate.

The Arizona state strategy identifies eighteen “Capability-Specific Objectives.” The “Eighteen objectives support the National Homeland Security Strategy, the National Preparedness Goal, the SHSS goal and priorities, by addressing threat and

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<sup>22</sup> The California State Homeland Security Strategy, [www.homeland.ca.gov/pdf/2008\\_CA\\_State\\_Homeland\\_Security\\_Strategy.pdf](http://www.homeland.ca.gov/pdf/2008_CA_State_Homeland_Security_Strategy.pdf) (accessed January 13, 2008).

<sup>23</sup> Mark Lowenthal, *Intelligence from Secrets to Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2006).

<sup>24</sup> Commonwealth of Massachusetts State Homeland Security Strategy, Office of Domestic Preparedness, 2004.

vulnerability.”<sup>25</sup> Yet, not one of the eighteen objectives instructs municipal police leaders as to what they must do to help the state reach its homeland security goals. Next to the California strategy, the Texas strategy offers the most detailed information for municipal law enforcement. (Interestingly the term “law enforcement” is mentioned fifty times in the Texas strategy – more than any state reviewed. The California strategy mentions law enforcement forty-one times, Arizona twelve times, and Massachusetts only seven times.)

Similar to the other states in this review, Texas does not provided specific roles, responsibilities and guidelines for police agencies. Texas certainly includes police agencies into state strategy, but clear, prevention-based responsibilities are not defined. The Texas strategy is designed as “a high-level road map for our homeland security efforts over the next five years.”<sup>26</sup> If the strategy is only a high-level road map, where do police executives or other homeland security professionals find guidance – from a low-level road map?

One area where Texas strategy does provide limited guidance to police executives is in the area of training. Texas proposes to “establish statewide counterterrorism and intelligence training requirements for law enforcement and other homeland security-related personnel.”<sup>27</sup> Similar to California, Texas police executives can send personnel to standardized training that is designed to support the state’s intelligence efforts. Through this specific training, police agencies can integrate (albeit at a minimum level) into the state’s homeland security strategy.

The primary problem with each of the strategies examined in this review is the distinct lack of specificity for municipal police executives. Police executives must know where their specific homeland security responsibilities begin and end. They must know what is determined to be local responsibility and state responsibility.

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<sup>25</sup> 2007 Arizona Homeland Security Strategy, <http://www.azdohs.gov/SecurityStrategy.htm> (accessed November 10, 2008).

<sup>26</sup> Texas State Homeland Security Strategy.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

The driving motive of a state homeland security strategy should be to devise a comprehensive methodology that clearly and precisely defines how individual state assets integrate into a unified framework. The methodology must provide specific roles and responsibilities for police executives. It must define the state's expectations for police agencies in the areas of infrastructure protection, border security, intelligence collection, regionalization, terrorism investigation and awareness. State homeland security strategy must provide overarching strategic plans, as well as specific guidance and detailed instruction when necessary.

### **3. Professional Law Enforcement Organizations**

The third body of literature relevant to this research emanates from the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). These two organizations are the premier professional law enforcement organizations in America. Subsequently, these organizations should provide the necessary guidance municipal police leaders need to secure their communities from terrorism effectively.

Both the IACP and PERF have published documents that examine the multitude of problems associated with municipal homeland security and broad national strategy. Each organization has made important recommendations in a host of homeland security-related areas to the federal government, federal law enforcement agencies, state agencies and municipal police executives.

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) is an agency whose stated goal is "to advance the science and art of police services; to develop and disseminate improved administrative, technical and operational practices and promote their use in police work."<sup>28</sup> It accomplishes this goal by providing municipal police leaders with the necessary guidance they need to lead their departments effectively.

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<sup>28</sup> International Association of Chiefs of Police, <http://www.theiacp.org> (accessed May 13, 2008).

In 2002, the IACP published a document entitled: “Leading from the Front: Law Enforcement’s Role in Combating and Preparing for Terrorism.”<sup>29</sup> This document marks the beginning of a very proactive and forward-thinking approach toward developing a framework for local homeland security strategy. In this document, the IACP provides specific guidance for police leaders in areas of prevention, intelligence, relationship building, response - and many others. This publication calls upon municipal police executives to provide leadership in homeland security and to “build and maintain strong ties and an open dialogue with other federal law enforcement agencies.”<sup>30</sup> One of the most important recommendations made in this document is:

“The chief’s first step to assess community risk is to assign an officer or unit to identify potential targets and to enhance security at those targets. This step must be taken even when a department’s resources are limited. In preparing a community plan, the officer should assess potential targets, consider security measures, help develop a security plan for potential targets, and advise on protective measures.”<sup>31</sup>

The above quote demonstrates that the IACP recognizes the importance of having someone in the municipal police department assigned to homeland security duties. The guidance provided here is based on preventative action. It tells police leaders to assess potential targets and identify vulnerabilities in their community, and to help identify solutions to those vulnerabilities.

Another forward-thinking recommendation made by the IACP is that police agencies maintain a suspicious incident log (separate from the main duty log) in order to more efficiently track and detect potential terrorism activities. These two recommendations have the potential to save hundreds, if not thousands of people from being killed by terrorists.

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<sup>29</sup> International Association of Chiefs of Police, *Leading from the Front: Law Enforcement’s Role in Combating and Preparing for Terrorism*, [http://theiacp.org/search\\_results/?cx=015870105778908594253%3Ajtqwqbd13miy&cof=FORID%3A11&q=leading+from+the+front&sa=#1009](http://theiacp.org/search_results/?cx=015870105778908594253%3Ajtqwqbd13miy&cof=FORID%3A11&q=leading+from+the+front&sa=#1009) (accessed November 17, 2008).

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

This is precisely the kind of prevention-oriented guidance the IACP and PERF must provide more of. And, this is the type of guidance this review sought to find in the national and state strategies. This caliber of guidance has utility for municipal police leaders and can be immediately implemented by virtually any law enforcement agency.

Overall, this is an excellent document for municipal police departments; the guidance it provides should not be ignored. Where the document fell short is in the area of depth. Police executives need more preventative-type guidance that can be immediately implemented into a municipal homeland security plan. Securing the community is the special skill of the municipal police department. The IACP should develop that skill.

In 2002, The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), supported by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), published the first of six volumes entitled, “Protecting Your Community From Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement.”<sup>32</sup> Together, these volumes represent the most comprehensive collection of homeland security-related guidance for the municipal police community. Each volume is dedicated to a particular homeland security-related law enforcement issue. The topics include Local Federal Partnerships, Working With Diverse Communities, Preparing for and Responding to Bioterrorism, The Production and Sharing of Intelligence, Partnerships to Promote Homeland Security and Partnering for Preparation and Response for Critical Incidents.

Overall, these six volumes are excellent starting points for municipal police leaders. Police executives can refer to each volume for guidance and apply that guidance toward developing a municipal homeland security program. These documents are broad in scope, covering a multitude of topics in homeland security ranging from national policy to building partnerships with the local citizenry. Experts in the fields of intelligence, emergency services, law enforcement, fire and a host of related disciplines

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<sup>32</sup> All six volumes can be located online: <http://www.policeforum.org/library.asp?MENU=346> (accessed November 17, 2008).

contributed to the development of each volume. Subsequently, the recommendations contained therein derive from the collective experiences and knowledge of numerous professionals, rather than just one expert or agency.

Despite the enormous breath and depth of the topics covered in these volumes, they are missing one important component – a framework for municipal homeland security. Many of the recommendations provided in the series are meaningful and have utility for police agencies, but they must be applied to a structured framework. Making recommendations to police executives is only the first step in constructing a homeland security strategy. The next step – the critical step – is determining how to implement those recommendations best.

## **B. CHAPTER SUMMARY**

This literature review demonstrates that municipal police executives have not received defining guidance relative to their agencies' specific homeland security roles and responsibilities. This review makes evident the absence of national, state or municipal-level strategy that integrates municipal police agencies into America's domestic security efforts. Federal strategy is too broad to be effective at the municipal level, and state strategy typically lacks specificity. And, professional organizations such as the IACP and PERF have provided local agencies only bits and pieces of detailed homeland security-related information. Subsequently, municipal homeland security efforts continue to be fragmented and decentralized.

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### **III. EVIDENCE**

#### **A. INTRODUCTION**

This thesis asserts that municipal police departments are not proactively involved in America's homeland security strategy. As a result, America is not protected from terrorists and other malcontents who wish to do us harm. This thesis also asserts that America lacks a definitive domestic information and intelligence collection strategy. Most police departments collect homeland security or anti-terrorism information much the same way as before 9/11 – serendipitously.

For purposes of this research, municipal homeland security (MHLS) duties are considered to be those activities that protect (in a proactive and preventative way) a municipality from terrorists and potentially catastrophic accidents. MHLS centers on identifying a community's vulnerabilities and implementing solutions to those vulnerabilities. Proactive activities include (but are not limited to) building collaboration with homeland security agencies; conducting risk and vulnerability assessments for businesses, schools and infrastructures; hardening potential targets; developing site-security plans for major events. Municipal homeland security is purposefully proactive in design and is not concerned with emergency response procedures.

Anti-terrorism (AT) duties are those activities that concentrate primarily on finding terrorists, their sympathizers, and the crimes that support terrorism. AT focuses on identifying and arresting terrorists. Anti-terrorism duties are considered a sub-component of homeland security duties; homeland security duties are not considered a sub-component of AT duties.

Determining which police departments in the United States have a sworn officer assigned to homeland security or antiterrorism duties is nearly impossible. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, there are approximately 15,833 municipal police and

local sheriff departments in the United States – and, there is no central registry or agency at the national or state level that tracks the number of homeland security or anti-terrorism officers. Contacting some 15,800 police agencies was impractical.

Even those states that have terrorism liaison officers do not have a central registry to account for active TLO numbers. California and Arizona, two states that utilize TLOs, track how many people have taken their states' TLO training course, but do not track which TLOs are active and which have been re-assigned to other responsibilities.

On the other hand, numerous municipal police departments and governmental agencies track the personnel assigned to specialties such as gang violence, child abuse, juvenile delinquency, domestic violence, and drugs in schools. A search of the website for the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs reveals numerous reports on the subject.<sup>33</sup> Hopefully, at some point in the near future, federal and state governments will consider homeland security an important enough responsibility to track municipal homeland security efforts – beyond how many people have taken a terrorism-related course.

Before examining available data on municipal-level homeland security and anti-terrorism programs we must first approximate how many municipal police officers there are in the United States today.

In 2004, there were approximately 621,992 full-time sworn municipal law enforcement officers in 15,833 jurisdictions, according to the Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.<sup>34</sup> During that same time, federal agencies employed 106,000 full-time personnel authorized to make arrests and carry firearms.<sup>35</sup> The FBI website states that on September 30, 2008, the FBI had approximately 12,851 special agents.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics, 2000: Data for Individual State and Local Agencies with 100 or More Officers, <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/lemas00.htm> (accessed October 1, 2008).

<sup>34</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Law Enforcement Statistics, <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm> (accessed October 1, 2008).

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> FBI, <http://www.fbi.gov/quickfacts.htm> (accessed October 1, 2008).

These numbers indicate there are 5.9 municipal police and sheriff officers for every 1 federally employed, full-time agent (621,992 divided by 106,000 = 5.9 officers). If we re-calculate the equation using the 2008 FBI personnel data, there are 48.4 municipal police and sheriff officers for every 1 FBI agent (621,992 divided by 12,851 = 48.40).

In terms of sheer numbers, the municipal police community dramatically outnumbers federal agents. Consider that municipal police and sheriff officers live and work in the very communities terrorists are planning to strike and it is easy to see why these officers should comprise the largest component of America's homeland security strategy.

## **B. WHERE TO FIND DATA?**

As previously mentioned, there is no national or state database that tracks the number of municipal police officers assigned homeland security or anti-terrorism duties. Therefore, this researcher considered federal and state agencies that would most likely be aware of which police departments have designated homeland security or anti-terrorism officers. The U.S. Attorney's Office was identified as such an agency, due to the fact that this agency operates Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATACs) throughout the United States. These ATACs have open membership for law enforcement agencies and serve as the primary link between local law enforcement and federal-level anti-terrorism effort.

The U.S. Justice Department, the parent agency of U.S. Attorney's Offices, states in its 2007-2012 Strategic Plan that ATACs "...will coordinate antiterrorism initiatives by ensuring that federal, state, and local enforcement efforts are focused and coordinated as they pursue targets that may be connected to terrorism."<sup>37</sup> If focusing and coordinating local law enforcement's antiterrorism efforts are priorities for the U.S. Attorney, one would assume that agency tracks which police departments have antiterrorism officers.

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<sup>37</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Fiscal Years 2007- 2012 Strategic Plan, <http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/strategic2007-2012/> (accessed October 5, 2008), 28.

In order to keep the data for this project manageable, this researcher focused on the six New England states of Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut and Rhode Island. Either the Anti-Terrorism Coordinator or the Intelligence Research Specialist for each U.S. Attorney's Office was asked how many police departments have a sworn part-time or full-time officer assigned to homeland security or anti-terrorism duties.

In each instance, the person on the telephone did not know – with absolute certainty – how many officers in their state were assigned to these important responsibilities. This revelation is not surprising, given that police executives are not required to report to the U.S. Attorney's Office – or anywhere for that matter – the names of officers they assign homeland security (HLS) or anti-terrorism (AT) duties. In addition, police executives are not required to notify the U.S. Attorney's Office whenever an officer is assigned away from homeland security duties. Moreover, U.S. Attorney personnel are not required to identify which police departments have dedicated HLS or AT personnel. Therefore, the process of becoming acquainted with a U.S. Attorney's Office (at least in this research area) is based solely on self-introduction.

Typically, when a police officer is assigned homeland security responsibilities (either full- or part-time) that officer makes himself or herself known to the U.S. Attorney's Office. The process usually does not work the other way around. Subsequently, the U.S. Attorney's Office rarely has an accurate account of which police departments are actively conducting HLS or AT activities in their communities. However, the anti-terrorism coordinator and the intelligence research specialist are in the best position in each state to know which police departments either have or do not have HLS or AT officers. Every U.S. Attorney's Office hosts homeland security-related training events and ATAC meetings. These meetings occur as often as monthly or as infrequently as once every six months. Surprisingly, there are no established criteria as to how often an ATAC meeting should be held. However, the training events and meetings are often well-attended by homeland security, law enforcement and federal-agency personnel. This researcher has personally attended meetings in Massachusetts that have had more than 200 hundred attendees.

Through the personal contacts established at training events and meetings, ATAC personnel learn which departments have terrorism specialists and which do not. However, there is a caveat. If a police department's newly appointed homeland security or anti-terrorism officer does not attend the ATAC meetings, or at least introduce himself or herself to ATAC staff, the U.S. Attorney's Office will not be aware of that officer's efforts.

This process is the reason the U.S. Attorney personnel interviewed for this research were not aware of the exact number of officers working HLS or AT and can only provide estimations. It is important to note this research does not intend to evaluate or criticize the efforts of Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council personnel. However, the process ATAC and municipal police personnel meet must be examined in order to support the assertion that municipal police departments are not proactively involved in America's homeland security efforts.

It is also important to note, that it is highly unlikely a U.S. Attorney's Office – particularly ATAC personnel – would not be aware of a full-time municipal homeland security or anti-terrorism officer operating in their state. Any newly appointed full-time HLS or AT officer would likely introduce himself or herself to the U.S. Attorney's Office. In every instance, ATAC personnel could identify the number of full-time municipal police officers (they knew of) who were assigned AT responsibilities.

### **C. THE RESEARCH AREA**

New England is comprised of six states and more than 14 million citizens. It has many densely populated regions that contain some of America's most historical landmarks and critical infrastructures. Many of the world's most technologically advanced companies headquarter their business operations in New England – particularly along Massachusetts' Route 128, also known as America's Technology Highway. There are major airports, seaports, commercial and financial centers, bioresearch labs, and one of the country's most important hospital complexes in New England. In addition, three

New England states (Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont) share international borders with Canada. All of these entities, along with the region's 14.1 million citizens, are tightly compacted in just 71,992 square miles.<sup>38</sup>

Within the 71,992 square miles of the six New England states, there are 1,536 cities and towns protected by 716 municipal police agencies and 64 sheriff departments. These communities and police departments are supported by four Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) located in Massachusetts, Maine, Rhode Island and Connecticut. Vermont and New Hampshire do not have JTTFs.

The table below illustrates the number of municipalities, police and sheriff departments, municipal police officers assigned to homeland security or anti-terrorism duties, estimated state population, square miles and the number of estimated motor vehicles in each state.

The statistics reveal a distinct lack of proactive homeland security effort on behalf of the municipal law enforcement community. In each state, there is only a handful of officers' assigned HLS or AT responsibilities.

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<sup>38</sup> Information regarding the six New England states obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, <http://www.census.gov/> (accessed October 1, 2008).

<b>Approximation of Municipal Police Officers Assigned to Homeland Security</b>							
State	Cities & Towns	Police Depts.	Sheriffs Depts.	Officers Assigned	State Population	Square Miles	Registered Vehicles
Maine	495	113	16	2	1,274,923	35,385	1,071,876
Massachusetts	351	324	14	4	6,437,193	10,555	5,385,215
New Hampshire	266	196	10	1	1,235,786	9,350	1,059,963
Rhode Island	40	39	4	3	1,048,319	1,545	805,548
Connecticut	169	106	6	5	3,510,297	5,543	3,051,952
Vermont	247	49	14	0	623,908	9,614	587,668
Total	1,568	827	64	15	14,130,426	71,992	11,962,222

Table 1. Approximation of Municipal Police Officers Assigned to Homeland Security<sup>39</sup>

Maine, by far the largest state in New England, has nearly 500 municipalities, more than 1 million automobiles on its roadways, and an international boarder. Yet, there are only two municipal police officers assigned to anti-terrorism duties in the entire state. In addition, these two officers are assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (as of this writing) on a full-time basis. This means there are no local police officers in the entire state of Maine actively identifying community vulnerabilities and undertaking other preventative-type homeland security measures to protect local communities from terrorism. No one is conducting target hardening, assessing risk and identifying community vulnerabilities, researching public documents and investigating dangerous business practices. Officers assigned to Joint Terrorism Task Forces do not perform such proactive activities; these officers concentrate on investigating terrorists and suspicious activity leads.

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<sup>39</sup> Table data obtained from several sources: [www.gov](http://www.gov) websites for each state. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/csllea04.htm> (accessed October 1, 2008); U.S. Department of Transportation, [http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohim/hs06/motor\\_vehicles.htm](http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohim/hs06/motor_vehicles.htm) (accessed October 1, 2008).

The data for the other New England states is equally as troubling. Massachusetts has nearly five times the population of Maine, yet has only four full-time municipal-level officers working homeland security. (This figure does not include analysts assigned in the Boston Police Departments Regional Intelligence Center.) In Massachusetts, one of the four officers is assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force. The other three are Boston Police officers working directly for the intelligence center.

Similar to Maine, New Hampshire shares an international border with Canada, has more than 100 police agencies, and more than 1 million automobiles on its roadways. However, this state has only one municipal police officer assigned to homeland security duties. The statistics are similar in Rhode Island and Connecticut.

In Vermont, the numbers are even more disappointing – no municipal police officers are assigned HLS or AT responsibilities. This is the case despite the fact Vermont shares an international border with Canada and there are open-source reports of terrorist organizations operating in that country. According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) website, “... with the possible exception of the United States, there are more international terrorist organizations active in Canada than anywhere in the world.”<sup>40</sup> Yet, not a single municipal law enforcement executive in Vermont has taken the proactive measure of assigning someone to municipal homeland security responsibilities, even on a part-time basis.

#### **D. CHAPTER SUMMARY**

Chapter III illustrates a number of significant and troubling points. First, it is plainly evident that municipal police agencies do not consider homeland security a core police mission. If they did, there would be more municipal police officers assigned to homeland security and anti-terrorism responsibilities. Typically, when the police community embraces a new mission, resources are quickly dedicated. For example, at the municipal police level, there are police officers specifically trained and assigned to investigate gangs, prostitutes, illegal drugs, school violence, traffic law violators, warrant

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<sup>40</sup> Anti-Defamation League (ADL), [http://www.adl.org/terror/tu/tu\\_0401\\_canada.asp](http://www.adl.org/terror/tu/tu_0401_canada.asp) (accessed October 2, 2007).

absconders and even people who fail to register their dogs. Yet, the majority of municipal police agencies in post-9/11 America do not have anyone on staff dedicated to finding those who intend to kill thousands of unsuspecting citizens. To compound this problem, the majority of police agencies do not have anyone on staff looking for the force-multiplying mechanisms or community vulnerabilities terrorists seek to exploit.

Second, there is clearly an absence of a municipal-level collaborative and preventative-based homeland security strategy. Municipal-level HLS and AT programs are either created or not created at the discretion of municipal police executives; there is no integrated or collaborative municipal HLS strategy.

In addition, there is no consensus as to what is expected of municipal police agencies in the homeland security arena. Subsequently, the municipal police community's response toward homeland security is woefully inadequate. If "the penalty of inadequacy was high before: now it could be final."<sup>41</sup> A single fatality is not enough for modern-day terrorists. Terrorists of the day think in multitudes and consider mass calamity a starting point, rather than an end point. As police organizations continue to focus on response and traditional crime – what they know best – the operating environments of police officers and terrorists move increasingly further apart. As a result, terrorists are enabled and given an advantage over the police and other HLS assets. Essentially, homeland security becomes a game of "catch-up" rather than prevention. Subsequently, American society is placed in harms way as our citizens and infrastructure are made easy targets for terrorists. Instead of being part of a solution, municipal police departments are now part of the problem – a very big part – because our inaction is self-destructive and actually empowers terrorists.

Third, this chapter demonstrates the lack of an effective mechanism to identify and collect homeland security information and intelligence. If no one at the municipal police level is proactively searching for HLS-related information, the likelihood of not finding such information is certain. Not finding HLS information does not equate to being safe. Rather, it demonstrates the need for a more effective collection system.

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<sup>41</sup> Malham M. Wakin, ed. *War, Morality, and the Military Profession* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979).

Fourth, this chapter indicates that society has not yet required the municipal police community to broaden its mandate to include homeland security and terrorism prevention. There seems to be no pressure from the citizenry, elected officials at any level, or the federal government in this regard. Do Americans assume police agencies automatically take the necessary steps to protect them from terrorism? Or, do citizens simply not care enough about terrorism to notice (or complain about) the lack of municipal police effort in this important area? It appears that homeland security does not occupy its rightful place in the hearts and minds of American citizenry.

What we know, what this chapter clearly illustrates, is that our municipal police agencies are not proactively involved in homeland security, our hometowns are vulnerable to attack, and that America has a great deal of domestic security work left to accomplish.

## **IV. IMPERATIVES AND POLICY OPTIONS**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

Imperatives, as defined in this research, are essential components of a strategy (policy option) that must be present in order for it to be effective. If any one component is missing, the strategy may founder, fail completely, or in some instances – cause people to die. “Strategies vary by level, function and time frame.”<sup>42</sup> Different agencies and levels of government “develop strategies to deal with the issues they have identified.”<sup>43</sup> In the case of the federal government, homeland security-related strategy has been developed with the stated goal of securing America.

However, national strategy is not effective at orchestrating the homeland security efforts of America’s municipal law enforcement community. New strategy must be developed. To this end, eleven critical imperatives are identified that must be present if the strategy is to be effective at the local level. The imperatives were formed by examining national strategies, government reports, academic textbooks, professional articles, and by extracting the experiences gained during this researcher’s twelve years in the professional law enforcement field. Seven of those years were spent working full time in homeland security.

The imperatives are: Synergy; Collaboration; Intelligence Function; Vision; Mission; Goals; Affordability; Roles and Responsibilities; Proactive Prevention; Regionalization; and Bottom-Up Design. This research evaluates three policy options against these imperatives to determine which approach is best suited for the municipal police community, the local citizenry, and America.

There are three policy options (alternatives) that homeland security policy makers can adopt: (1) The status quo. This option continues with more of the same; (2)

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<sup>42</sup> John Bryson, *Strategic Planning for Public and NonProfit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004).

<sup>43</sup> Ibid

Implementation on a broader scale of current anti-terrorism programs such as the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Program that originated in California; or (3) A completely new homeland security strategy, such as the Municipal Homeland Security Strategy (MHSS).

## B. CRITICAL IMPERATIVES




Figure 1. The Eleven Critical Imperatives

### 1. Synergy

Synergy is “the interaction of two or more agents or forces so that their combined effect is greater than the sum of their individual effects.”<sup>44</sup> Succinctly stated, synergy is high efficiency. It is achieved when municipal police agencies seamlessly integrate and

<sup>44</sup> synergy. Dictionary.com. *The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/synergy> (accessed November 12 2008).

efficiently operate into a homeland security design with other security-related entities. In this context, the output of synergistic effort amounts to more than any one component can muster.

Each policy option is examined for its capability to create effective and highly efficient homeland security-related synergy at the local level. Questions such as: Does the policy option effectively integrate homeland security assets at the community level? Does the policy option create an environment where HLS synergy can develop? Do assets depend upon each other to accomplish homeland security goals or do they concentrate on separate mandates? Synergy is at the high-end of the efficiency spectrum.

## **2. Collaboration**

Collaboration is “agencies, organizations, and individuals from many tiers of public and private sectors, working, training, and exercising together for the common purpose of preventing terrorist threats to people and property”<sup>45</sup> The intent of collaboration is to build in capacity while simultaneously building out inefficiency. In the context of this thesis, collaboration is prevention-based and designed to detect terrorism pre-incident. Effective municipal homeland security strategy must facilitate collaborative effort. Collaboration is considered the minimum level of interaction between municipal police agencies and other homeland security entities.

Therefore, each policy option is examined for its capability to create and foster collaboration across disciplines, jurisdictions and levels of government. And, each policy option is examined for its ability to foster collaboration of HLS assets at the local level. This examination seeks to answer the following questions: Does the policy option require HLS assets to work together or is interaction only occasional? Do HLS assets work together and effectively address HLS issues within the community?

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<sup>45</sup> William Pelfrey, *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management* 2, no. 1, art. 5 (2005), 7.

### **3. Intelligence Function**

Systematic domestic intelligence collection is the defining characteristic of a secure community – and nation. Where there is a lack of systematic collection, there is vulnerability, exposure to exploitation and ineffectiveness. To be effective at identifying, collecting, and disseminating homeland security-related information there must be an established and easily accessible mechanism for the intelligence function at the municipal level. Without such a mechanism, information and intelligence is not efficiently collected or disseminated. Subsequently, information gets stacked in silos and lost in antiquated procedure.

In the context of municipal homeland security intelligence, homeland security personnel do not sit idle and wait for suspicious activity or homeland security-related leads to be serendipitously discovered. Rather, leads are actively sought after, collected, and vetted into a network of forward-thinking homeland security professionals.

To this end, the intelligence function encompasses all aspects of homeland security information and intelligence. Each policy option is examined for its capability to develop the intelligence function of municipal police agencies in the arena of homeland security.

### **4. Roles and Responsibilities**

Effective municipal homeland security strategy must define the specific roles and responsibilities of municipal law enforcement agencies. Police executives must know what federal and state governments expect of their agencies, where their agency fits in with federal and state homeland security strategy and how municipal homeland security is performed.

Do local agencies coordinate with critical infrastructure and design security measures, or is that a responsibility reserved for state or federal agencies? Should local police officers search public records for indicators of terrorism? Should municipal police departments seek out employers who hire illegal aliens, or is that reserved for non-local law enforcement?

There must be specific guidelines for municipal police agencies if they are expected to protect their citizens from terrorism. If they are expected to fill this role, how is it accomplished? Do we leave that responsibility to individual chiefs and further the problem of decentralization? Or, should there be uniformity and standards applied to homeland security strategy?

Each alternative is examined for specific homeland security-related roles and responsibilities for municipal police agencies. The alternative must provide more than just guidelines – it must provide specifics.

## **5. Regionalization**

Regionalization is collaborative operations in defined boundaries. It is a multitude of disciplines and jurisdictions working together toward the common goal of securing a particular region. Regionalization builds capacity, provides economy of force and offers force multiplication. It is not about losing autonomy, but rather about facilitating collective action. It means improving communication and building pre-incident relationships before terrorism or catastrophic incidents occur. Regionalization facilitates increased familiarity with neighboring jurisdictions, personnel and potential targets. It standardizes procedures, streamlines processes, and raises situational awareness to new heights. In addition, information and intelligence is simultaneously vetted across multiple jurisdictions and disciplines faster than ever before possible. Regionalization is cooperative protection for local communities.

To be effective, an alternative must be concerned with securing multiple communities simultaneously. After all, no community is safe until all communities are safe. Therefore, regionalization of effort, operations, communications, technologies, monies, and personnel must be satisfactorily addressed if it is to meet the criteria of this imperative.

## 6. Vision

Homeland security strategy must have a clear vision as to what it needs to accomplish. Vision is looking toward a specific future. It is envisioning where you are and where you need to go. One of the most important aspects of vision is that it must be shared by all members of an organization, not just its leaders. In terms of municipal homeland security, the vision must be shared by multiple agencies and disciplines. Municipalities, municipal police agencies and citizens who participate must comprehend and share in the strategy's vision if they are to work together effectively. All participants must know where the strategy is headed and what it intends to accomplish. Effective homeland security vision involves forward-thinking, focused planning and desired end states.

At its best, a shared vision does the following.

- “Provides a corporate sense of being
- Provides a sense of enduring purpose
- Incorporates measurement of success
- Transcends day-to-day issues
- Has legitimate meaning in both the present and the future
- Empowers both leaders and followers to act”<sup>46</sup>

In order to meet the criteria of this imperative, each alternative is examined for its capability to provide meaningful vision to a broad spectrum of HLS entities toward the desired end-state of a secure community.

## 7. Mission

Mission “provides that sense of purpose” and direction necessary to accomplish goals.<sup>47</sup> A sense of mission organizes people and equipment and provides a sense of

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<sup>46</sup> Gordon Sullivan and Michael Harper. *Hope is Not a Method* (New York, NY: Broadway Books, 1979).

<sup>47</sup> John Bryson, *Strategic Planning for Public and NonProfit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004).

purpose. It “answers why an institution exists, its purpose/mandate. The mission is the key building block in the entire planning process.”<sup>48</sup> A sense of mission is evident when strategy participants move in a common direction.

To this end, each policy option is examined for its capability to provide a sense of mission to municipal police agencies and other homeland security partners as they work together to secure a community from terrorists.

## **8. Goals**

Goals “represent the strategy-specific states desired as a result of effective strategy implementation.”<sup>49</sup> Goals must be realistic, measurable and obtainable. They provide clarity and direction. Clearly defined goals propel forward people, assets and strategy while simultaneously limiting the possibility of deviation.

The three policy alternatives in this thesis are examined for evidence of clearly defined homeland security goals relative to people, organizations, processes, technologies and methodologies.

## **9. Proactive Prevention**

Just as offensive action often overtakes defensive strategy in the military world – especially when there is a technological advancement – proactive prevention dominates response in the homeland security world. Proactive prevention is much more than mere prevention. It is taking every possible step to secure the community from terrorists before they have the opportunity to attack. It means that homeland security personnel actively identify vulnerabilities and implement the solutions to those vulnerabilities. Proactive prevention is (but not limited to) creating community awareness programs, visiting with businesses and community groups on a daily basis, and creating the personal

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<sup>48</sup> Nova Scotia Agricultural College (NSAC), <http://www.nsac.ns.ca/admin/stratplan/terms.asp> (accessed August 1, 2007).

<sup>49</sup> John Bryson, *Strategic Planning for Public and NonProfit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004).

relationships necessary to create community-level information sharing groups. Proactive prevention also entails adopting new missions, mandates, ideas and technologies to secure a community from terrorists.

To this end, the operational philosophy of each policy option is examined. This examination seeks to determine whether each policy option meets the above criteria and is oriented toward prevention or response.

## **10. Bottom-Up Design**

Municipal homeland security is a bottom-up problem. In order to be effective at addressing the many complex issues associated with municipal homeland security, a policy option must be constructed with a bottom-up design that emphasizes the municipal police community and the local citizenry. A bottom-up design unites municipal police agencies in a common effort and creates ownership within the police community. The strategy must be implemented by municipal police departments with the support and guidance of state and federal entities. Lastly, it must form the base of regional, state and national strategy.

Therefore, the design of each policy option is examined. This examination sought to answer the following questions: Does the option consider local police agencies a vital component? Where is the option's HLS emphasis? And, does the option foster ownership at the local level? This thesis asserts that ownership of the policy at the local level is vital to strategy success. If there is no local ownership, there will be only limited and peripheral effort on behalf of municipal police agencies.

## **11. Affordability**

A strategy must be affordable in order for it to be effective and accepted at the municipal police level. Police agencies of all sizes and complexities must be able to implement and maintain the strategy without incurring significant financial hardship. In addition, the strategy must be sustainable at times of extreme financial distress.

## C. POLICY OPTIONS

### 1. The Status Quo

The first option for America's homeland security policymakers is to continue with the current homeland security strategy – the status quo. The status quo places the largest part of our nation's homeland security responsibility on the shoulders of federal law enforcement, federal intelligence agencies, and the nation's military (the big three), while asking very little from the municipal police community. National strategy orientation is decidedly federal and international in scope and does relatively little to integrate the decentralized municipal police community into the broader effort of protecting Americans from terrorists.

This option may be plausible as there have been no additional terrorist attacks inside the United States since 9/11 and a majority of Americans are now more concerned about the economy than terrorism. A June 15-19, 2008 Gallup poll asked the following question of 1,625 national adults:

*If you had to choose, which of the following presidential candidates would you be more likely to vote for -- [ROTATED: a candidate whose greatest strength is fixing the economy (or) a candidate whose greatest strength is protecting the country from terrorism]?*




Figure 2. Fix the Economy or Protect from Terrorism?<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Gallup website, Americans Prioritize the Economy over Terrorism, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/108415/Americans-Prioritize-Economy-Over-Terrorism.aspx> (accessed November 17, 2008).

The lack of attacks inside America, combined with the quick, pre-incident apprehension of terrorists when terrorists did attempt attacks, has undoubtedly assuaged America's feelings of anxiety toward terrorism. In a Gallup poll, conducted June 11-14, 2007, one month after the May 7 arrest of terrorists plotting to attack Fort Dix, fifty-five percent of Americans were not overly worried about terrorism.




Figure 3. Are Americans Worried About Terrorism?<sup>51</sup>

There is good reason for America's concern with the economy. A September 5, 2008, Seattle Times article recently stated "The Labor Department reported that the number of Americans who filed initial claims for unemployment benefits last week rose to near a five-year high."<sup>52</sup> The same article also stated, "Across the board, we're seeing evidence that labor conditions are worsening," said Carl Riccadonna, senior economist at Deutsche Bank Securities."<sup>53</sup>

<sup>51</sup> Gallup, <http://www.gallup.com/Home.aspx> (accessed April 23, 2007).

<sup>52</sup> Seattle Times, [http://seattletimes.nwsources.com/html/business/technology/2008159713\\_econ050.html](http://seattletimes.nwsources.com/html/business/technology/2008159713_econ050.html) (accessed April 23, 2007).

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

A struggling national economy translates into hard financial times for many of America's public service agencies and is forcing them to do more with less. In addition, the enormous demands placed on local police agencies by criminal gangs, illegal drugs and traditional crime is 24/7 and is often all the responsibility these agencies can handle. Add a struggling local economy into the mix and many police executives assert their agencies are incapable of handling anything extra. If America asks the municipal police community to take the lead in homeland security we may find ourselves causing more harm than good to our nation's security.

In the realm of domestic information and intelligence collection, very little proactive effort is occurring at the municipal level. When seeking information, most police agencies rely on chance discovery, shared open-source information, and the federal government. There is no nation-wide proactive domestic information and intelligence collection strategy being implemented in America. In his Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Nestor Duarte noted, "Domestic intelligence in the United States, specifically state and local HUMINT, is uncoordinated and inefficient to support the terrorism prevention mission."<sup>54</sup> Duarte is certainly right, but the problem is far worse than implied. Duarte's postulation leads us to believe there is something to coordinate. Under the status quo, there is nothing to coordinate in the majority of police agencies. There is no intelligence framework at the municipal level. In reality, most police departments do not conduct proactive homeland security intelligence collection because they do not know how to conduct such operations. Homeland security and terrorism information collection is a completely new mission for municipal police organizations. And, in today's economy many do not have the money for a dedicated intelligence effort. As a result, most police departments simply do not proactively attempt to identify homeland security or terrorism-related information.

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<sup>54</sup> Nestor Duarte, *Unleashing Our Untapped Domestic Collection is the Key to Prevention*, (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2007).

Despite the faltering economy, overburdened municipal police agencies, and the decentralized law enforcement and intelligence efforts, the current homeland security strategy has worked thus far for America. The proof is that a number of planned terror attacks on the American homeland have been thwarted pre-incident.

Overall, the status quo option presents some very compelling reasons why homeland security policy makers should stay on course with the current strategy. The best reason for continuing with the status quo is the fact that we have not been attacked at home since 9/11, more than eight years ago.

## **2. Expand Current Programs**

The second policy option for homeland security policy makers is to identify successful municipal-level homeland security initiatives and expand those initiatives into a national framework. The most commonly implemented municipal-level initiative in the U.S. is the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Program that originated in California.

The TLO concept has experienced intermittent popularity since introduced in 2001 by a group of police chiefs in southern California. Individual jurisdictions in California, Texas, Florida, Arizona, Michigan and Colorado have implemented TLO programs. However, no state has implemented a state-wide TLO plan. Therefore, TLOs continue to be appointed on a case-by-case basis at the local or regional level.

The TLO concept is to appoint at least one terrorism-trained sworn officer in every law enforcement agency within a particular region "...who has a basic understanding of terrorism and who can act as an information resource for members of the department."<sup>55</sup> Department personnel or community members submit terrorism-related information to their agency's TLO. This practice is known as self-reporting. In turn, the TLO submits the information to a Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEWG), or a regional fusion center, or a state fusion center. Furthermore, state-level intelligence entities disseminate information to law enforcement agencies through the TLO network.

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<sup>55</sup> The Terrorism Officer Information Network, [www.tlo.org](http://www.tlo.org) (accessed October 1, 2008).

A Terrorism Early Warning Group is a multi-disciplined task force of homeland security professionals who share homeland security-related information. According to an official at the East Bay Terrorism Early Warning Group, the TEWG is positioned between the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and local law enforcement agencies. According to the same official, TEWGs are being replaced by Regional and State Threat Analysis Fusion Centers. Accordingly, the East Bat TWEG is scheduled to lose funding at the end of 2008.

Essentially, TLOs serve as information points-of-contact for local law enforcement agencies and comprise "a structured system of contact personnel" for terrorism-related issues.<sup>56</sup> According to a senior level administrator in the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, TLOs fulfill their anti-terrorism responsibilities on an as-needed or collateral basis. This means the majority of TLOs are patrol personnel who spend their day performing their regular police duties. Only when there is a need for terrorism-related action are TLOs called into play.

TLOs in Arizona are primarily information conduits. They do not investigate terrorism-related incidents, but rather, collect information and pass it along to the JTTF.

Arizona follows a slightly different TLO design than California. In this state, there are four tiers of TLOs, referred to as "tiers 1 through 4." Tier 1 TLOs are the best trained and best equipped by the state. Tier 1 TLOs receive a vehicle, communication equipment such as a radio or cell phone, and a wireless laptop. Tier 4 TLOs receive no equipment.

Tier 1 TLOs are required to provide their agency or the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) at least 40 hours of anti-terrorism-related work each month. Tier 2 TLOs provide 20 hours of work and the lowest two levels (tiers 3 and 4) are not required to provide time to their agency or ACTIC.


Surprisingly, Arizona's TLOs do not concentrate on terrorism or homeland security responsibilities. Their primary duty centers on typical police responsibilities,

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<sup>56</sup> East Bay Terrorism Early Warning Group, [www.eastbaytewg.org/tlo\\_position.htm](http://www.eastbaytewg.org/tlo_position.htm) (accessed November 1, 2008).

such as criminal law violations and traffic enforcement. Furthermore, TLOs respond with their wireless laptop to major crime scenes, such as murders, even if not their patrol call.

TLOs in Arizona also serve as “first responders” who assist with intelligence at major incidents, such as earthquakes and other natural disasters. Some TLOs are fire service personnel and respond to fires and other emergency-related incidents.



Slide depicts Arizona’s vision of the TLO field response, relationship with the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (CTIC) and incident command personnel during a major incident. Note that concerned stakeholders are positioned on one side of the ACTIC and TLOs are positioned on the opposing side. This slide suggests that concerned stakeholders have direct access to the ACTIC and are not directly linked to TLOs. Slide extracted from a Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office PowerPoint presentation.

Figure 4. Arizona’s Vision of the TLO Field Response<sup>57</sup>

Whether in California or Arizona, TLOs serve primarily as information facilitators and operate in a “first responder” mode whenever there are major incidents.

<sup>57</sup> Norman Beasley, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, Arizona Counterterrorism Information Center, [www.search.org/files/ppt/Day2-Beasley.ppt](http://www.search.org/files/ppt/Day2-Beasley.ppt) (accessed December 13, 2008).

The reactionary nature of TLOs is described in the 2008 California State Homeland Security Strategy: “The Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) is the local agency point of contact for all terrorism-related alerts and suspicious activity reports, requests for information, warnings and other notifications from regional, state or federal homeland security agencies.”<sup>58</sup> The strategy says nothing of utilizing TLOs in a proactive manner for domestic intelligence collection or infrastructure protection.

The TLO concept, which was conceptualized and implemented by municipal police chiefs, does not mandate standardized skill sets or a universally accepted list of duties and responsibilities. Any agency that appoints a TLO is free to create (or not create) its own skill set and duty criteria. The East Bay (TEWG) website states: “Each agency will ultimately determine the duties and responsibilities of their TLO(s) based on agency staffing and similar duties already assigned to other individuals or units.”<sup>59</sup> The website also provides a list of suggested duties for TLOs. Subsequently, there is little uniformity as to what TLOs actually do. There is a basic understanding that TLOs serve as information facilitators; beyond that, TLO responsibilities are open to individual interpretations.

#### Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Suggested Duties

The suggested duties include:

Collecting, reporting, retrieving and sharing of materials related to terrorism.  
Such materials might include:

- Training Bulletins
- Information on schools and cases
- Books, journals, periodicals and video tapes
- Lists of official contacts
- Source person for internal or external inquiry
- Collecting, reporting, retrieving and sharing of terrorism intelligence
- Identifying and communicating with community stakeholders
- Contact person for community and private sector relationships

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<sup>58</sup> California Homeland Security Strategy, 15.

<sup>59</sup> East Bay Terrorism Early Warning Group, [www.eastbaytewg.org/tlo\\_position.htm](http://www.eastbaytewg.org/tlo_position.htm), (accessed November 1, 2008).

- Conducts, coordinates and/or facilitates departmental training with regard to terrorism and terrorist related subjects
- Designated agency media representative and/or spokesperson with respect to terrorism related information
- Designated agency representative to the Terrorism Early Warning Group<sup>60</sup>

The most common complaint relative to the TLO program is the lack of connection to the intelligence fusion centers. This lack of connection encompasses both regional and state intelligence entities. Because TLOs are primarily reactionary and spend the majority of their day working traditional law enforcement duties, they lose their relationship with analysts and fusion center personnel.

Overall, the TLO concept is a good one. It places terrorism specialists in local communities and streamlines the exchange of information. TLOs provide local points-of contact for terrorism-related matters, and theoretically, could serve as force multipliers for federal and state agencies - should a federal or state agency choose to use them as such. TLOs analyze local incidents, share information and assist with the intelligence function of incident command. The TLO approach is a good approach if the primary goal of the program is simply to move information from point to point.

### **3. Implement a New Strategy**

The third alternative for America is to implement a new homeland security strategy - one that is collaborative in design, considers the local citizens valued partners, and integrates all of America's homeland security, law enforcement, intelligence and military assets into a synergistic strategy. The new strategy must be based on the overarching concept of "municipal homeland security" and be constructed with a bottom-up design that supports federal and state homeland security strategy.

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<sup>60</sup> East Bay Terrorism Early Warning Group, [www.eastbaytewg.org/tlo\\_position.htm](http://www.eastbaytewg.org/tlo_position.htm), (accessed November 1, 2008).



In America, there are three levels of government, but only two levels of homeland security strategy. The MHSS approach is to create a foundational level of homeland security strategy that supports both national and state strategy.

Figure 5. Proposed Three Levels of Homeland Security Strategy

A new strategy must create community-level partnerships through unity of effort, efficiency, flexibility, structure, and commonality across a wide spectrum of multiple agencies, disciplines and jurisdictions. It must have a clear vision and mission statement that is equally applicable to federal, state and municipal entities of all sizes. Finally, the strategy must provide specific standards, objectives, goals, and performance measures that are realistic and can be met by municipal police agencies and communities alike. This thesis asserts there is such a strategy available to homeland security policy makers. That strategy is entitled: Municipal Homeland Security Strategy (MHSS).

The Municipal Homeland Security Strategy (MHSS) is a new approach to protecting the homeland – so new, in fact, that it completely redirects our national vision from federal-level entities to community-level partnerships. The new strategy flips our national strategy from a decidedly federal approach to a municipal orientation. After all, Thomas Ridge, former director of the department of Homeland Security, said, “...the homeland is not secure until the hometown is secure.”<sup>61</sup>

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
<sup>61</sup> Washingtonpost.com, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/24/AR2005122400373\\_pf.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/24/AR2005122400373_pf.html) (accessed November 17, 2008).

The new strategy would create a nationally standardized collaborative network of Municipal Homeland Security Programs (MHSPs). These programs will form the foundation of America's homeland security strategy by linking every community, large and small, in the country.

The MHSS is based on the municipal police community as well as the local citizenry. It is not based on a single point of contact at the local law enforcement agency (like the TLO Program). In this strategy, municipal police and local citizens are equal participants.

This strategy is about force multiplying, local partnerships and synergy. It combines all of America's homeland security assets and regionalizes them into collaborative groups, based on the pre-existing jurisdictions of local district attorneys. Instead of police agencies looking to join anti-terrorism and homeland security groups at the state or federal level, America's federal and state homeland security assets join municipal homeland security programs at the local level and collaboratively devise innovative ways to protect those communities from terrorism. Even businesses, large and small, will be asked to participate in this strategy. Municipal homeland security programs create shared responsibilities and are dedicated to local communities.

By placing homeland security assets into communities, municipalities are able to take ownership of their situation, identify shared interests, direct homeland security assets and solve specific homeland security-related problems.



The municipal homeland security strategy is truly collaborative in design. It integrates all of America's homeland security assets into a synergistic design dedicated to individual municipalities and regions.

Figure 6. Municipal Homeland Security Strategy (MHSS)

The MHSS is locally oriented and nationally applied. It capitalizes on the concept of regionalization and it provides the federal government with a specific regionalized framework for funding. In this strategy, the federal government transitions from lead homeland security entity to a support entity.

The following standards are imperative for the strategy to be fully successful.

- Every municipality must establish a municipal homeland security program and appoint at least one law enforcement officer as a Municipal Homeland Security Officer (MHSO).
- The law enforcement component of a municipal homeland security program must be constructed upon three equally important and mutually supporting components - awareness, prevention and investigation - and all are dedicated to a single community.
- Every municipality must establish a citizen component and appoint at least one person from the municipality's administration to the MHSP. The citizen component must be based on collaboration and be considered an equal partner in the program.

- Once MHSPs are operational, a municipal homeland security network (MHSN) must be created. Municipal Homeland Security Networks are a region's mechanism for domestic information and intelligence collection and dissemination. MHSNs are organized regionally – according to the local district attorney's jurisdiction.
- MHSPs must support current federal anti-terrorism and homeland security programs such as the F.B.I's Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).

Similar to the Terrorism Liaison Officer Program, the MHSS appoints homeland security specialists within every police department in the country. These officers are called Municipal Homeland Security Officers (MHSOs). Local leaders must determine whether to appoint full-time or part-time municipal homeland security officers based upon factors such as community vulnerabilities, critical infrastructure in the community or adjacent community, proximity to high priority targets, and population.

These officers are much more than terrorism-related points-of-contact. Rather, they are trained professionals whose responsibilities include all matters related to homeland security. MHSOs are dedicated to the local community and the immediate region. They concentrate on protecting their community from terrorism and catastrophic accidents.

#### **D. CHAPTER SUMMARY**

In order to secure her communities from terrorism effectively, America must implement a municipality-based homeland security strategy that advances the concept of municipal homeland security. The strategy must have immediate utility for municipal police agencies and it must be constructed upon a collaborative design. Communities are made safe when multiple agencies, disciplines and jurisdictions pull together and develop innovative protection methodologies. Making communities safe is too complex a responsibility for any one person or agency.

Each of the reviewed three policy alternatives has advantages and disadvantages for municipalities. The purpose of this research is to identify the smartest approach for America's future homeland security efforts. Does it make sense to continue with the status quo? Should we expand the TLO program into a national framework? Or should we adopt a new strategy that emphasizes synergistic action at the municipal police level? The next chapter will help sort through these important questions.

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## **V. ANALYSIS OF POLICY OPTIONS (ALTERNATIVES)**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

“At its essence, strategy is an intellectual construct linking where you are today with where you want to be tomorrow in a substantive concrete manner.”<sup>62</sup> Strategy serves as a bridge between vision and means. “... Strategy begins with tomorrow-the-vision and is the process of looking back and identifying the critical paths to the future.”<sup>63</sup> To be effective, a strategy must provide the necessary concepts and actions that must be taken to move forward an organization, army or vision. When a strategy lacks vision there is seldom unified action, and little progress is accomplished. Subsequently, every strategy, action plan and policy option must contain a set of critical elements that are essential to its success.

With this consideration in mind, each of the three alternatives (status quo, expand current programs, and implement new strategy) is examined for the critical imperatives. Imperatives are essential, and therefore, each must be present if an alternative is to have full utility for municipalities and municipal police agencies. If an alternative lacks any of the imperatives, it would not sufficiently address the complex issues related to municipal homeland security.

### **B. ANALYSIS**

The table below illustrates the differences among the three policy alternatives discussed in this thesis. Each alternative was examined for its ability to meet the imperative criteria described in Chapter IV and its ability to provide municipalities with a comprehensive municipal homeland security strategy.

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<sup>62</sup> Gordon Sullivan and Michael Harper, *Hope is Not a Method* (New York, NY: Broadway Books, 1997).

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

### Analysis Matrix

<b>Imperatives</b>	<b>Status Quo</b>	<b>Terrorism Liaison Officer Programs</b>	<b>Municipal Homeland Security Strategy</b>
<b>Synergy</b>	Virtually no integration or synergy at any level.	TLOs not integrated w/ other HLS assets.	HLS assets depend upon each other to accomplish mission.
<b>Collaboration</b>	Limited – typically only when necessary.	Slightly more than status quo, much less than MHSS.	Collaborative effort is considered foundational level of synergy.
<b>Intelligence Function</b>	Municipal-level intelligence function is virtually nonexistent.	Limited proactive collection effort/ mostly receivers of information.	Municipal-level intelligence function is central to strategy.
<b>Roles and Responsibilities</b>	No defined roles and responsibilities.	For TLOs only and non-standardized.	Clearly defined and standardized.
<b>Regionalization</b>	No standardized regional effort defined.	Limited to TLOs. (Only if every PD in region appoints TLO)	MHSS based on regionalization. (Redundancy)
<b>Vision</b>	No vision for municipal police agencies in broader HLS strategy.	Limited to TLOs. No broader vision of (integrated) HLS strategy.	Creates municipal-level HLS entities: MHSS → MHSP → MHSN.
<b>Mission</b>	HLS mission for municipal police agencies not defined.	Limited mission beyond information and intelligence facilitation.	Create synergistic HLS effort at municipal-level. Clearly defined missions.
<b>Goals</b>	Specific goals for municipal police not identified.	Limited in breath and depth/information and intelligence only.	Defined and measurable.
<b>Proactive Prevention</b>	No, primarily a reactionary design – response oriented.	Severely limited, TLOs spend majority of day performing traditional police duties.	Based on preventative effort.
<b>Bottom-Up Design</b>	National strategies based on federal-level initiative and assets.	Designed and based at municipal-level. (TLOs only)	Designed and based on municipal-level entities. (Inclusive)
<b>Affordability</b>	No, majority of effort paid w/overtime funds.	Limited affordability for local departments – overtime laden.	Yes, MHSS considered core mission for police assets. (Integrated)

Figure 7. Analysis Matrix

## **1. Synergy Analysis**

To have synergy, a municipal homeland security strategy must integrate all available homeland security assets into a single design. Strategy participants must depend upon each other and work together regularly and seamlessly to create an environment where high efficiency becomes the standard.

All three of the alternatives require homeland security assets to work together with a common purpose. However, only the municipal homeland security strategy advocates a municipal-level integrated approach where homeland security assets come together and develop innovative ways to secure a community. The MHSS seeks to maximize individual asset capabilities by integrating federal, state and local entities on *multiple levels*. In this strategy, specific roles and responsibilities are assigned (collectively) to homeland security assets that must be fulfilled if a community is to be secure. When each asset meets its particular responsibilities, a comprehensive community security plan results. Synergy emerges because federal, state and local homeland security assets depend upon each other (and work so closely together) in the MHSS.

The concept expressed here is similar to the workings of an automobile engine. Each component of an engine has an important and specific function. If a particular component is not performing, the engine falters, or worse, fails completely. The MHSS operates on the same concept. Each component of the MHSS has a specific function to fulfill. And, each component's effectiveness is dependent upon the other components, forging highly important and synergistic relationships. In today's complex security environment, synergy is a must. Society can no longer afford to have multiple HLS agencies pursuing individual and uncoordinated objectives. The MHSS is the only policy option that creates the opportunity for synergistic relationships to develop.

The Terrorism Liaison Officer Program does not maximize the capabilities of federal and state homeland security, antiterrorism and emergency response entities. It does not require TLOs, federal, state, military, intelligence, private industry, local government and community stakeholders to join together and develop a community

security plan. The main mantra for TLOs is to receive terrorism information, then quickly report that information into the nearest intelligence fusion center or JTTF. According to interviews conducted for this research with state and municipal officials in California and Arizona, TLOs work primarily alone on homeland security matters as they receive intelligence, conduct training or perform risk analysis and threat assessments in their communities.

Arizona is estimated to have approximately 190 trained TLOs. These officers operate as information facilitators between the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC), the state's only fusion center, and local police and fire agencies. In Arizona, these officers respond to all major crimes and do not focus on terrorism.

America needs more than the occasional assessment from a part-time terrorism liaison officer. Our communities need comprehensive community security and intelligence plans and a unified approach to municipal homeland security. This type of effort can only come from a strategy that concentrates on the municipal community and creates an environment where strategy participants work so closely together that synergy is the result. Because there is no such effort in the TLO program, there is no opportunity for synergy to emerge.

The status quo is primarily concerned with broad, overarching strategy that does not synergistically integrate municipalities and local police agencies into a national framework. The national strategy for homeland security states, "Although we have substantially improved our cooperation and partnership among all levels of government, private and non-profit sectors, communities, and individual citizens, we must continue to strengthen efforts to achieve full unity of effort through a stronger and further integrated national approach to homeland security."<sup>64</sup> If the national strategy recognizes a lack of unity, there is certainly no homeland security synergy at the municipal level. The status quo focuses primarily on sharing information and creating "information-centric"

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<sup>64</sup> The National Strategy for Homeland Security.

relationships with local entities. Sharing information does not create synergy, is narrowly focused on a single aspect of homeland security and may be considered a basic expression of collaboration at best.

## **2. Collaboration Analysis**

Imagine for a moment you are a police officer in a municipal law enforcement agency. You have just been appointed as the department's first-ever homeland security officer. Your job is to secure the community from terrorists, find terrorists and those who support terrorism, locate all vulnerabilities that have potential to kill hundreds if not thousands of citizens, and implement solutions to those vulnerabilities. You are instructed to build relationships with state and federal law enforcement agencies and acquire as much homeland security and terrorism-related information as possible. Finally, you are assigned the task of developing a strategy that alleviates the community's fear of terrorism, and you are expected to learn about foreign cultures.

Who, or which agency would you turn toward for advice? Where can you learn all of the information you need in order to be successful at your job? There is no school or class for municipal homeland security officers. And, there are no other municipal homeland security officers in the communities adjacent to yours – you are the only one in your entire region – maybe even the state.

The answers to these questions are only found in collaborative effort.

Since 9/11, collaborative effort in the homeland security field has improved. In the status quo option, more local police officers participate on FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) than ever before, there are more intelligence fusion centers in the country, Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATAC's) are set-up in every state, and there are a plethora of electronic anti-terrorism databases available to municipal police agencies.

However, today's collaboration does not go far enough to secure our communities from 21<sup>st</sup> century terrorism. Each JTTF has only minimal municipal police participation – only a handful of local officers are assigned to any one JTTF. Local police agencies simply cannot afford to assign an officer on a full-time basis to a federal task force. In

addition, most Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils no longer meet regularly. One ATAC administrator informed this writer that his ATAC group meets only once every six months. And, most of his communication with municipal police agencies occurs through e-mail lists.

In communities that have instituted a Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program, collaboration occurs more frequently than in those communities without such a program. However, this research revealed that even in communities where TLOs are operational, collaboration is insufficient and sporadic. Most TLOs are full-time patrol officers who have attended a TLO training class. The majority of their day is spent working on typical law enforcement duties such as patrol and criminal investigation. Many cannot get past the routine demands of the day. Their time is not spent on collaborative homeland security-related efforts, nor is it spent interacting with other homeland security entities. Therefore, collaboration takes place only out of necessity, not routine.

In a conversation with a California municipal police chief, this researcher was informed that most TLOs do not have significant connectivity with their regional fusion center. And, that lack of connectivity is the most common complaint regarding TLOs. If the lack of connectivity is the most common complaint, and there is little collaborative effort taking place between TLOs and fusion centers, there is little collaboration taking place elsewhere.

However, the problem is much deeper than a lack of connectivity. The problem is in design, not in operations. TLOs were intended to serve as information points-of-contact at the local level. By definition, collaboration is restricted to activities centering on terrorism information. TLOs were designed to collaborate primarily with state and regional fusion centers. If the connectivity is not abundant in the few counties that have TLOs, the approach will be equally ineffective if expanded to fit a national scale.

In order to meet the definition of collaboration as defined in this research, each alternative must build capacity and built-out inefficiency. Neither the status quo nor the TLO program meets this definition. The TLO program may work collaboratively when

necessary, but does not dramatically improve agency capacity. Collaboration must be routine, not occasional; it must be considered a central aspect of a strategy, not a peripheral aspect.

### **3. Intelligence Function Analysis**

Each alternative is examined for a municipal-level (systematic) information and intelligence collection methodology – referred to as  $I^2$  – that incorporates into a regional framework all five stages of the intelligence cycle: planning and direction, collection, processing, analysis and dissemination. Collection must be a proactive process that involves not just a single community, but an entire region.

Terrorists often attack a target that is close to where they live. In fact, 44 percent of terrorists (all types of terrorists) attack targets that are located within 30 miles of their residence.<sup>65</sup> The relatively short distance between residence and target translates into increased opportunity for municipal police agencies to encounter and detect terrorism. Consequently, suspicious incident  $I^2$  must be systematically collected, vetted to a regional group, analyzed at the nearest fusion center, and disseminated back to a particular region or community. This must be accomplished in a timely and effective manner.

All three alternatives identify a procedure to collect information and submit that data to a fusion center for analysis. The TLO program collects information primarily through the efforts of TLOs, who collect pieces of information at the community level and submit it to the nearest fusion center. TLOs were designed as information conduits and as such, their primary purpose is to facilitate the exchange of terrorism-related information and intelligence. Due to the fact that most TLOs are occupied primarily with traditional job responsibilities, little proactive  $I^2$  collection is taking place in the community. TLOs cannot proactively collect terrorism-related information when their primary assignment is to a patrol car with a focus on traditional crime.

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<sup>65</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, *A Look at Terrorist Behavior: How They Prepare and Where They Strike*, <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/journals/260/terrorist-behavior.htm> (accessed February 20, 2008).

The majority of police departments do not have assigned TLOs, and the intelligence situation is much worse. There is no one inside most municipal police departments who is specifically trained to investigate suspicious and terrorism-related incidents. No one is proactively scouring police reports, public documents, or the community for information that could be utilized in the war on terror. Relationships with federal and state terrorism officers have not been established, community anti-terrorism partnerships have not been created, and managers of infrastructure are still on their own when it comes to securing their facilities against terrorists. To compound this problem, the typical police officer is a generalist who possesses a functional knowledge of a broad-spectrum of traditional police-related topics - domestic abuse, drunken driving, theft. Most municipal police officers lack the basic knowledge to identify terrorism-related incidents, with the exception of the most obvious.

Additionally, in the serendipitous chance a police officer does uncover terrorism-related information, there is no well-defined system to process that data. Most police officers do not know where to report suspected terrorism information. Sadly, most police officers do not know anyone who works in a fusion center and most have never visited a fusion center. Moreover, most fusion center analysts have never visited the communities in their operational area.

Neither the status quo nor the TLO alternative offers a comprehensive strategy for domestic information and intelligence collection. And neither approach supports the implementation of a municipal-level intelligence network similar to the one designed in the municipal homeland security strategy. In fact, neither the status quo nor TLO approach even defines the intelligence function of municipalities or municipal police agencies. Instead, collection responsibilities and the broader intelligence function at the municipal level are left open to individual interpretation.

The MHSS takes a completely different approach to intelligence collection. It places the municipalities and municipal police agencies at the foundation of America's domestic intelligence efforts by defining the intelligence function of these entities and by creating regional intelligence groups known as Municipal Homeland Security Networks (MHSNs). These networks are comprised of multiple jurisdictions, disciplines and

agencies. A MHSN is dedicated to a particular region of the state, is based on the local district attorney's jurisdiction, and incorporates (fuses) federal, state and local personnel – all at the municipal level.

Unlike the TLO and status quo alternatives, the MHSS approach requires that MHSNs produce intelligence products such as regional intelligence plans (RIPs) and regional technology plans (RTPs) for particular regions of the state. These products provide homeland security administrators a method to evaluate the effectiveness of a region's (MHSN's) intelligence activities.

As the evidence indicates, the only alternative that offers municipalities a comprehensive methodology for information and intelligence collection is the municipal homeland security strategy.

#### **4. Roles and Responsibilities Analysis**

Each policy alternative was examined to determine if it provides the municipal police community with specific preventative-based homeland security roles and responsibilities. Does the alternative provide guidance that directs municipal police homeland security activities? Are the responsibilities of police agencies defined for addressing issues such as illegal immigration and infrastructure protection? Does the alternative place the responsibility of community security on the municipality, state agencies or federal-level strategy? This researcher asserts that a community's security is best handled at the municipal level through collaborative action with state and federal homeland security partners.

The status quo option is heavily dependent on federal-level action and national strategy. It relies on the federal government exercising its enormous strength in international efforts, military action and federal law enforcement and intelligence initiatives. The main problem with this approach is that al-Qaeda and other asymmetric threats side-step national strengths. Terrorists don't commit frontal attacks on strengths; they commit rear attacks on weaknesses. In America, we are weakest at the community-level.

The status quo option is a top-down approach to a bottom-up problem. For most municipalities, this approach is akin to building a roof without first building a foundation. Yes, the roof may offer protection from light rain, but it won't protect you from a storm. The light rain mentality creates an environment where the continued absence of specific roles and responsibilities for municipal law enforcement agencies is permitted to exist.

The TLO program was designed by municipal police chiefs. Surprisingly, this approach does not clearly define the homeland security responsibilities of municipal police agencies. What it does define are the responsibilities of terrorism liaison officers. TLOs were designed to facilitate information sharing. They were not designed to provide the entire municipal law enforcement community specific roles and responsibilities in homeland security.

The MHSS does offer the municipal police community and municipalities specific homeland security-related guidance. It creates collaborative partnerships, and then assigns responsibilities to those partnerships. It requires local police agencies to become a community's central homeland security entity; to devise community security and intelligence plans; to lead homeland security partnerships; to identify community vulnerabilities and the solutions to those vulnerabilities; to conduct homeland security awareness training; to secure infrastructure; and to become integral components of regional intelligence networks.

The municipal homeland security strategy is the only policy alternative that provides specific homeland security-related guidance for municipal police agencies.

## **5. Regionalization Analysis**

Of the three alternatives, the municipal homeland security strategy is the only option that specifically designed regionalization into the strategy. In this strategy, municipal homeland security networks are created and serve as the primary mechanism for intelligence identification, collection and dissemination. The network is comprised of municipal homeland security officers from law enforcement agencies in the region and

representatives from homeland security-related agencies from every level of government. In addition, selected community stakeholders, such as critical infrastructure managers, actively participate in the security network.

The MHSN regionalizes the homeland security assets of a particular region by incorporating every agency into the network. One of the most important design aspects of the MHSN is that it is organized according to the local district attorney's jurisdiction. This way, the local district attorney can take measure of the terrorism-related incidents that are discovered in his or her jurisdiction and provide legal guidance to network members. Because federal agents, state police officers and fusion center personnel participate in the network, all capabilities of these important entities can be brought to bear on the region's security.

The regionalization of homeland security and intelligence assets brings a new level of detail to the homeland security mission that is simply not provided in the TLO or national strategy approach. Neither of these approaches is based on regionalization and protecting regions of a state. The TLO approach is to appoint a designated terrorism specialist at every police department and then have those individuals connect with a fusion center. Beyond appointing TLOs, there is no plan to organize them into regional groups that work toward securing the entire region.

Developing regional security plans is essential to securing our communities. Infrastructure in one community is a threat to neighboring communities. Therefore, regional familiarity is essential for homeland security personnel. The MHSS is the only option that considers regionalization as an essential component to community security.

## **6. Vision Analysis**

The MHSS provides the municipal police community with a clear and definable homeland security vision. The TLO and status quo alternatives do not. The vision of the MHSS is to secure communities through the development of municipal-level, prevention-based HLS entities. The vision is to bring together available federal, state and local HLS assets and synergistically integrate those assets at the local and regional levels. The

architecture of the MHSS entails participative networks, preventative action and encompassing multiple agencies and disciplines into a synergistic design. No other policy alternative offers such a comprehensive, community-based HLS vision.

This research discovered that in every region of the country where TLOs operate, the primary vision of TLOs is to facilitate the dissemination of terrorism-related information and intelligence (I<sup>2</sup>). Instead of focusing on the broader mission of securing communities from terrorism, the TLO vision narrowly concentrates on a single aspect of homeland security. In post-9/11 America, concentrating on a single aspect of HLS is dangerous. The TLO design takes a keyhole approach to a panoramic issue.

A good example of the limited nature of the TLO vision is found in a Maricopa County Sheriff's Office power point presentation. Slide 14 states, "The TLO position was created to relay terrorism and criminal related information/intelligence efficiently and appropriately between the ACTIC [Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center] and other agencies"<sup>66</sup> To be effective at securing our communities from terrorism, a HLS-related vision must encompass more than a single aspect of HLS – it must encompass multiple aspects.

While the TLO vision is too narrow to effectively secure our communities from terrorism, the status quo vision is too broad. In fact, the status quo alternative offers the municipal police community little more than broad statements and overarching generalizations. The NSHS states,

The United States, through a concerted national effort that galvanizes the strengths and capabilities of Federal, State, local, and Tribal governments; the private and non-profit sectors; and regions, communities, and individual citizens – along with our partners in the international community – will work to achieve a secure Homeland that sustains our way of life as a free, prosperous, and welcoming America."<sup>67</sup>

How does such a broad vision statement create buy-in at the municipal level? It does not. Municipal police executives and police officers cannot extract a sense of purpose from

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<sup>66</sup> Norman Beasley, Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, Arizona Counterterrorism Information Center, [www.search.org/files/ppt/Day2-Beasley.ppt](http://www.search.org/files/ppt/Day2-Beasley.ppt) (accessed March 3, 2008).

<sup>67</sup> The National Strategy for Homeland Security, 13.

this expansive statement. In addition, it leads police executives to believe the federal government already has a plan for municipal police agencies and will be responsible for “galvanizing” police capabilities in America. Simply stated, the national strategies do not provide a realistic vision for America’s municipal police community. And, without meaningful and relative vision, there is no unified homeland security strategy.

## **7. Mission Analysis**

Each policy alternative is examined for its capability to provide a HLS mission for municipal police agencies and municipalities. Of the three alternatives, the MHSS is the alternative that best accomplishes this objective.

The MHSS places local police agencies at the forefront of municipal homeland security by requiring these entities to serve as a community’s primary HLS agency. In the MHSS, the local police department is responsible for a community’s HLS efforts – not the federal government. The police department leads and coordinates local HLS effort as the MHSO and CHSO build community-level partnerships and devise community security plans. The MHSS functions on collaborative networks, community participation, and the identification of community vulnerabilities. All of these (and many more) are the responsibility of the municipal police department. In modern America, municipal homeland security is the prime mission local police.

Neither the TLO, nor the status quo alternative offers the municipal law enforcement community a definitive and comprehensive homeland security mission. In the TLO approach, part-time officers facilitate the exchange of information and intelligence between fusion centers and local agencies. While this exchange is certainly important to homeland security efforts, it does not define the broader police role in municipal homeland security. The mission of TLOs is clearly tied to the exchange of information; it is not tied to the broader mandate of municipal homeland security.

The status quo alternative fails to provide America’s most prolific homeland security asset, the municipal police profession, with a specific homeland security mission. If national or state strategy fostered a community-based approach to HLS, there would be more municipal police officers working HLS issues in America. As Chapter III

demonstrates, there are surprisingly few municipal police officers working HLS at the community-level. Therefore, it is evident the status quo alternative fails to provide a HLS mission for municipalities and their police departments.

## **8. Goals Analysis**

The results of the mission and goals analyses are very similar. Neither the TLO, nor status quo alternatives offer substantive goals for municipal police agencies. The TLO alternative's primary goal is to facilitate the exchange of terrorism-related information. It does not define specific HLS-based goals for police agencies or the communities that employ them. Therefore, the TLO alternative fails to meet the criteria stipulated by the goals imperative.

In the status quo alternative, the goals of municipal police departments in HLS strategy are not defined. At the national level, the stated goal is to secure America from terrorism. However, no national strategy offers specific HLS-related goals for municipal police agencies. Therefore, the largest police profession in America is left wondering how they fit into national HLS strategy. Subsequently, most police agencies leave the responsibility of hometown security to the federal government.

However, at the national level there is concerted effort in the area of information sharing. Every state now has at least one fusion center and the entire intelligence cycle continues to receive more than its fair share of attention. However, information sharing is just one aspect of HLS and should not constitute the majority of national effort.

America needs specific HLS-related goals for municipal police agencies – the MHSS provides those goals. In the MHSS municipal police agencies have specific goals: establish MHSPs and MHSNs, identify community and regional vulnerabilities, create community security, intelligence and technology plans, secure local infrastructure, identify and incorporate community stakeholders into MHSPs and MHSNs, conduct HLS training with MHSOs, CHSOs and other strategy participants, develop methodologies that target crimes that support terrorism and many others. No other alternative provides such specificity when it comes to municipal-level HLS.

## **9. Proactive Prevention Analysis**

This imperative is based on offensive action and forward thinking. It means that homeland security professionals are actively working on terrorism and homeland security issues - safe houses, fraudulent document operations, illegal aliens, people and crimes that support terrorism, community vulnerabilities, loopholes in security measures, infrastructure weaknesses, dangerous business practices, inefficiency in investigation methods and any vulnerability that may enable or benefit terrorists.

The municipal homeland security strategy is based on proactive action that is geared solely toward prevention, not response. The strategy stipulates that municipal homeland security officers spend a portion of their day, everyday, working toward finding people, events and procedures that can hurt a community. The MHSS creates an environment where its officers are placed in advantageous positions to detect terrorism by interacting with community stakeholders, learning business practices, participating in community groups, conducting community awareness training and reviewing public information documents. MHSOs also participate in ATAC events and serve as force multipliers for JTTFs.

The TLO approach to terrorism is primarily reactionary in design. While preventative effort begins when a lead is detected or supplied to by a source, most TLOs are not actively seeking out terrorism-related matters throughout the day. A member of a California Terrorism Early Warning Group informed this researcher that most TLOs are busy during their normal workday handling typical duty demands, mostly associated with patrol. If they encounter a terrorism-related incident, they will investigate. But, they are not in the community on a daily basis concentrating on homeland security matters, including prevention.

The TLO approach is decidedly reactionary in design and leaves enormous loopholes in our communities for terrorists to exploit. Until TLOs spend at least a portion of their day actively investigating terrorism and planning for prevention, this approach will continue to be reactionary and response oriented.

The status quo offers very little as far as proactive prevention is concerned. Most municipalities, emergency responders and local law enforcement agencies continue to orient on response. In June 2004, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security stated, “The committee is concerned that while terrorism prevention is a national priority, little is being done to create prevention expertise in our nation’s first responders. This is in stark contrast to response and recovery training programs. Without a well-developed terrorism prevention plan, state and local agencies lack a key piece in the fight against terrorism.”<sup>68</sup>

Our country has always been response oriented. One reason for our national tunnel vision is that response is much easier to evaluate than prevention. It is also big business for companies to sell response-oriented equipment and training materials. Dr. Christopher Bellavita, in his article, “What is Preventing Homeland Security?” asks, “Has anyone seen the terrorism prevention plan?”<sup>69</sup> The short answer is this: No we haven’t seen it, and we’re unlikely to, as long as response continues to dominate our national mindset.

## **10. Bottom-Up Design Analysis**

Of the three policy options available to homeland security policy makers, the MHSS is the only strategy that is designed with a comprehensive bottom-up design. This strategy places municipalities, municipal law enforcement agencies and other strategy participants (such as civic leaders, average citizens, and business leaders) at the base of the strategy. In this approach, all homeland security entities support the municipal homeland security program at the local level. Participants (federal, state, local, citizen) come to the municipality and work with the municipal homeland security officer and the community security officer. The entire strategy is based on the municipal community.

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<sup>68</sup> Committee Report accompanying the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2005, HR 4567, <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?&report=hr541&dbname=cp108&> (accessed November 17, 2008).

<sup>69</sup> Christopher Bellavita, “What is Preventing Homeland Security?” *Homeland Security Affairs* 1, no. 1, art. 3, (2005).

The TLO program is also based on a bottom-up design, but unlike the MHSS, the TLO design is not comprehensive. It consists mostly of TLOs and fusion center personnel. This approach is heavily dependent on law enforcement and intelligence personnel and limits participation of the citizenry and business leaders. In addition, the TLO concept is too narrowly focused on information sharing. As a result, the majority of TLO responsibilities turn on sharing information and establishing information conduits where information flows more readily. In a modern and nuclear world, homeland security involves significantly more than sharing information. It involves creating and maintaining a comprehensive system of layered protection for the municipal community.

The status quo alternative offers very little by way of a bottom-up design. There is no national prevention plan or national strategy that places the municipality's security in its own hands. Instead, the current national strategies focus on broad strategy as they devise targeted approaches to improve information sharing and allocating homeland security funding.

A bottom-up design is unique and requires that homeland security agencies adopt a new way of thinking and operating. The federal government is at times innovative, but in this regard, it is not meeting even a minimum standard.

## **11. Affordability Analysis**

America is experiencing historic financial turmoil. The faltering economy affects our nation's homeland security efforts in a myriad ways. Municipalities and law enforcement agencies are placed under financial strain as they attempt to accomplish more with less, and in many cases, simply attempt to maintain with less.

Yet, our homeland security efforts must continue. Municipal police agencies must find a way to protect their communities from terrorism while not creating additional financial hardships. The municipal homeland security strategy takes into account the increased financial pressure that law enforcement agencies are experiencing and offers a realistic solution.

The MHSS, similar to the TLO strategy, requires municipal law enforcement agencies to appoint at least one person who is already on staff as a homeland security specialist. These specialists are called Municipal Homeland Security Officers (MHSOs) and are appointed either on a part-time or full-time basis.

The strategy requires that all MHSOs spend a portion of their day (everyday) working on homeland security-related issues – not just terrorism. In the case of a part-time MHSO, he or she may spend only an hour or two working on securing the community. These officers are responsible for all matters related to homeland security and terrorism prevention, and duties include the following.

- Collect suspicious incident, terrorism and homeland security-related intelligence
- Identify, collect and investigate leads
- Create relationships with citizens and members of the business community;
- Identify vulnerabilities by conducting vulnerability and risk assessments;
- Develop school emergency plans
- Conduct homeland security-related training

In summary, MHSOs work homeland security everyday – even if it is only for a few hours.

The strategy is made affordable because it requires only a few hours each day of the MHSO's time. And, time is available if municipal agencies adopt homeland security as a core mission. "On the average, about 5 hours of an officer's 8-hour shift are spent at the officer's discretion, while 3 hours are spent on assigned tasks."<sup>70</sup>

Unlike the TLOs, MHSOs are not alone in the awesome responsibility of protecting a community from terrorism. The MHSS takes a collaborative approach toward municipal homeland security by creating partnerships and incorporating federal, state and citizen expertise into the strategy. When responsibility is shared in this manner,

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<sup>70</sup> National Criminal Justice Reference Service,  
<http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=83392> (accessed October 7, 2008).

so are the costs of protecting the community. Using this approach, multiple agencies work on developing community security plans and regional intelligence plans. No one agency shoulders the entire cost of protection.

The current strategy of protecting the community is decentralized and fragmented. And, there is no discernable plan to develop the concept of municipal homeland security. Therefore, no one agency has taken the lead in this important area. This means that whenever there is an increase in the Homeland Security Advisory System, municipalities shoulder the majority of costs. Because there is no community security plan in place when the advisory level increases, municipal police departments do what they have always done – hire overtime officers. Without a plan, these officers usually stand at an assigned post until the advisory level is lowered, or (in some cases) the overtime money runs out. Either way, the municipality is paying for temporary homeland security that is costly in more ways than one.

### **C. CHAPTER SUMMARY**

The analysis chapter demonstrates that both the TLO and status quo options are not effective at meeting 21<sup>st</sup> century demands for homeland security strategy. If we expect HLS strategy to be effective at protecting our communities from terrorists, we must design strategy that fosters synergy. In addition, homeland security strategy must spread the responsibility of domestic security across multiple disciplines, jurisdictions and agencies. America's HLS assets must work together to secure from terrorists our hometown infrastructure, businesses, schools, public events, transportation systems and many other components of modern society.

There are conception, design, implementation, evaluation, training, prevention, planning, operational, legal, administrative, technological and many other issues to consider relative to homeland security effort. No one agency or level of government can effectively accomplish all of these tasks. Preventing terrorism in modern times is a remarkably difficult task, but it can be accomplished with comprehensive, preventative-based HLS strategy. The MHSS is the strategy we need to address today's – and tomorrow's – threats.

The status quo and TLO alternative each have their positive aspects. The status quo alternative is heavy with federal-level action and national strategy. Any country that seeks to address modern day terrorism today must have federal-level leadership. Federal agencies must do their part to counter terrorism in their own areas of responsibility, but they must also work closely (synergistically) with municipalities to secure hometown America. This is the principal difference between the status quo alternative and the MHSS. In the status quo, federal level agencies continue to view terrorism through the lens of their own glasses. And, they're looking primarily at their own areas of responsibility. This leaves the majority of municipalities and municipal police agencies on their own. Yes, there is collaboration between federal entities and local police, but the collaboration is limited, sporadic and not nearly comprehensive enough to provide effective and lasting HLS effort.

The TLO alternative provides a mechanism for police departments to collect and exchange information. As the analysis points out, the parameters of the TLO design are narrow and too focused on a single aspect of HLS – information. This narrow field of vision leaves the other aspects of HLS vulnerable and neglected. And that can be dangerous for Americans. It does not make sense to rely upon a strategy that is primarily concerned with information exchange when the enemy is doing everything within its ability to hide information from us.

The MHSS addresses numerous HLS issues, assigns HLS responsibility to collaborative partnerships, creates synergy, and is adaptable to any community, region or situation. It supports current federal and state HLS efforts, provides community awareness and offers a mechanism to train intelligence analysts employed by federal, state and regional fusion centers. It maximizes the abilities of multiple agencies, disciplines and specialties and it is focused on the community. One of the best characteristics of the MHSS is that it focuses all of America's homeland security assets at the community level – not the federal or state level.

## **VI. MUNICIPAL HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY (MHSS)**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

As a country, America can do better at protecting herself at home. We can create and implement a national strategy that integrates all of America's homeland security assets into a single synergistic design. Homeland security, intelligence, military, law enforcement, business, and community entities can work collaboratively – at the community level – with the common purpose of protecting the citizenry where we live, work and play.

By developing community-level homeland security networks, we construct a prevention-oriented strategy that brings all of America's assets to bear on our collective security. The purpose of this approach is to build unification and commonality across multiple disciplines, while simultaneously placing the municipality and municipal police department at the forefront of America's homeland security efforts. After all, terrorists do not seek to attack our military strengths; they plan to attack our citizens and infrastructures – in our communities.

The Municipal Homeland Security Strategy (MHSS) is a new approach to homeland security that supports current homeland security, intelligence, defense, and counterterrorism efforts. Abandoning current security programs is not necessary. This strategy is designed to enhance existing efforts – not render them irrelevant. In addition, the financial costs of implementing this approach are minimal. In many cases, it requires the appointment of a homeland security point-of-contact (full-time or part-time), and a few hours of that person's time each day.

The municipal homeland security strategy is, in this writer's opinion, America's – and certainly a local community's – greatest asset in the war on terrorism. This strategy is localized, dedicated to a single purpose, based on a community policing construct, and has the potential to save countless lives and millions of dollars in economic property. Through the implementation of the municipal homeland security strategy, the local

community – with the assistance of federal agencies and other homeland security assets – becomes the primary caretaker of their own security. The single most important aspect of this strategy is that it is based on prevention, not response.

In 1862, President Abraham Lincoln aptly stated, “As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew.”<sup>71</sup> The homeland security strategy presented in this research is a sensible and new approach that places our nation’s security in the hands of a communal network. The adage, “It takes a network to fight a network,” aptly applies to the MHSS approach.

## **B. THE STRATEGY’S (DETAILED) DESCRIPTION**

The strategy is to create a nationally standardized collaborative network of Municipal Homeland Security Programs (MHSPs). These programs will form the foundation of America’s domestic security strategy by organizing communities into mutually-supportive regional networks. The following standards are imperative for the strategy to be fully successful:

- Every municipality must establish a Municipal Homeland Security Program and appoint at least one officer as a Municipal Homeland Security Officer (MHSO). Local police executives must determine whether to appoint full-time or part-time municipal homeland security officers based upon factors such as community vulnerabilities, critical infrastructure in the community or adjacent community, proximity to high priority targets, and population.
- Every municipality must appoint at least one member of the community’s administration as a Community Homeland Security Officer (CHSO). The CHSO works closely with the MHSO and together these officers are responsible for leading and coordinating the community’s security and prevention plans.
- Municipal Homeland Security Programs must be constructed upon three equally important and mutually supporting components: awareness, prevention and investigation, and all are dedicated to a single community.

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<sup>71</sup> The Cognitive Edge, [http://www.cognitive-edge.com/blogs/dave/2008/10/the\\_dogmas\\_of\\_the\\_quiet\\_past\\_1.php](http://www.cognitive-edge.com/blogs/dave/2008/10/the_dogmas_of_the_quiet_past_1.php) (accessed November 17, 2008).

- Once MHSPs are operational, a municipal homeland security network is created. The municipal homeland security network (MHSN) is regionally organized according to the local district attorney's jurisdiction and serves as the region's mechanism for domestic information and intelligence collection and dissemination.
- MHSPs support current homeland security-related programs, such as the F.B.I's Joint Terrorism Task Forces, U.S. Attorney's Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils and other pre-existing federal and state anti-terrorism efforts.
- Each MHSP must support the collaborative operational design of the MHSS. In the MHSS, all homeland security assets come together at the municipal level and construct innovative strategies to secure the municipality. Community stakeholders and other selected community members (managers of critical infrastructures, school administrators, etc.) not only participate, but are considered critical components in their community's MHSP and their region's MHSN.

The intent of municipal homeland security strategy is to accomplish far more than investigating terrorism. This strategy is designed to bring the local community and municipal police departments to the forefront of America's homeland security efforts by creating a comprehensive homeland security strategy that is based upon prevention. MHSPs are collaborative networks that are comprised of not only local police officers (MHSOs), but also community stakeholders, federal and state law enforcement and intelligence officers, military personnel, citizens, managers of infrastructure, private business employees, district attorneys, state and local agencies, school departments, community groups and any other person or entity that can positively contribute to a community's, or region's, domestic security.

These programs are standardized, coordinated, inexpensive, and focus on awareness, prevention and investigation. They bring civilian, law enforcement, military and intelligence communities together through the implementation of a collaborative network strategy designed to counter emerging 21<sup>st</sup> century transnational and domestic asymmetric threats. Municipal Homeland Security Programs are the community policing programs of the future.

## **1. Awareness Component**

In the United States, Americans spend approximately 620 billion each year on advertising. Nearly every magazine, newspaper, television show or business is supported to some extent by advertising dollars. There are billboards, posters, radio and television commercials, signs of all sizes, directed mailings; even the Internet is inundated with advertising. Americans are bombarded by advertisements on a daily basis - on our highways, in our homes, at work, on vacation, and even when we eat. (Take a minute to read your cereal box). In fact, it is estimated that Americans “encounter from 3,500 to 5,000 marketing messages per day, vs. 500 to 2,000 in the 1970s.”<sup>72</sup>

It is difficult to escape the advertisers’ onslaught.

Yet, where is the advertising division of the Department of Homeland Security? How does the federal government ensure the citizenry is informed (dare I say educated) to the dangers and realism of terrorism? Do our national strategies have an awareness component? Do Americans know the signs of terrorism and where to look for them? Do the majority of police officers know the signs of terrorism? The answers to these questions are an emphatic – no. There is no national campaign to make people aware of terrorism or the signs of terrorism; (unless you classify the Homeland Security Alert System as a national awareness campaign.) We only hear of occasional arrests and thwarted terrorism plots after the fact. This is not prevention-oriented marketing or education, and we are not capitalizing on the force-multiplying effect the citizenry and our police officers can offer to our homeland security efforts.

Trained citizens, sensitive facility employees and law enforcement officers are America’s most prolific anti-terrorism force multipliers. They are the eyes and ears of our communities. Yet, these important resources are not organized into collaborative partnerships. Subsequently, they sit idly on America’s homeland security sidelines, not knowing what activities or which people in their communities may be linked to terrorism. The majority of business and infrastructure employees are not trained to detect suspicious

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<sup>72</sup> USA Today, [http://www.usatoday.com/money/advertising/adtrack/2005-06-19-cannes-box\\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/money/advertising/adtrack/2005-06-19-cannes-box_x.htm) (accessed October 30, 2008).

activity at their own facilities. If they did “by-chance” discover a suspicious incident, many do not know to whom to report the incident. The awareness component addresses all of these issues.

The awareness component contains two sub-sections: public and private. The division is necessary because there are specific awareness factors that one group (private/law enforcement) should be made aware of while the other group (public/citizens, employees, etc.) should not. Consider electric-generating power plants, for example. At these facilities – and every other critical infrastructure – there are specific locations that are particularly vulnerable to attack. The so-called “switch yard” is the most vulnerable at electric-generating power plants. A switch yard stores generated electricity before it is sent into the electric grid. If a terrorist or disgruntled employee decided to target a switchyard, the plant could very easily be knocked off the grid, causing either a brown-out or full-fledged blackout. Switch yards are especially vulnerable because they are usually outside the main building, surrounded only by a chain link fence and not otherwise protected.

Knowing a facility’s particular vulnerability is called “site familiarity.” In the case of a power plant, police officers – certainly municipal homeland security officers – should be familiar with the switch yard and its significance to the plant, the community and the regional area. However, members of the general community should not be made aware of the plant’s vulnerabilities for obvious security reasons.

In the MHSS, the MHSOs receive site familiarity training at every sensitive facility and vulnerability inside the community. In some instances, entire MHSNs receive awareness training – along with representatives (analysts) from the nearest state or regional fusion center. This raises the collective knowledge and investigative ability of an entire region.

To further illustrate the importance of the awareness component, imagine the police department receives a report of a suspicious male outside the power plant taking pictures of the switch yard. If that department did not have a municipal homeland security program, none of the police officers would have “site familiarity” and therefore,

would likely not recognize the significance of this report. On the other hand, if this incident occurred in a community that had a municipal homeland security program and conducted awareness training, every patrol officer working that day should immediately recognize the significance of the report and the need to investigate quickly and thoroughly. In addition, if this incident took place at a power plant where the employees and adjacent citizenry received awareness training, it is very likely this activity would have been detected at the beginning of the incident, rather than toward the end.


We increase our chances of successfully detecting suspicious incidents when municipal homeland security officers conduct awareness training with community members. Private and public employees, community and neighborhood groups, private security forces, hospital staffs, school staffs, apartment building managers, bus drivers, mailmen – and nearly every organized community group is a candidate for awareness training. Members of the community become the eyes and ears of municipal homeland security programs.

Sadly, most of America's municipal, state and federal law enforcement agencies do not conduct site familiarity awareness training. Many law enforcement officers at every level of government lack specific knowledge of critical infrastructure vulnerabilities in the communities where they are employed. In my experiences as a professional law enforcement officer (assigned to homeland security for seven years), I met law enforcement officers, some of whom have been employed in the same community for more than 25 years, who did not possess even a basic level of site familiarity with the infrastructures and schools in their community. This is particularly disconcerting as it is exactly these vulnerabilities terrorists are seeking to identify and attack. Without a high level of site familiarity, it is virtually impossible for a police department, or any law enforcement agency, to adequately protect – in a preventative way – their community or infrastructure from terrorism.

*a. Intelligence Analysts and Awareness Training*

Intelligence analysts are another group that derives significant benefit from awareness training. Many analysts lack operational field experience and therefore

do not have site familiarity knowledge of the businesses, infrastructures and other vulnerable localities they often read about and analyze. Through the MHSS, analysts can attend the same awareness training as police officers and employees of vulnerable facilities. By attending awareness training, analysts become familiar with a particular site (and similar sites), and listen firsthand to employees who talk about their experiences. The analysts gain valuable institutional knowledge, and learn specifics about the number, frequency and types of suspicious incidents at a facility. Most important, they establish contacts and build relationships with employees of the facility, municipal homeland security officers, and other members of the community. Site familiarity awareness is a mission essential task of intelligence analysts; the MHSS helps analysts fulfill that mission.



Municipal Homeland Security Programs are constructed upon three equally important and mutually supporting components: awareness, prevention and investigation, and all are dedicated to a single municipality.

Figure 8. Three Components of a Municipal Homeland Security Program

## 2. Prevention Component

Prevention is the key to America's homeland security strategy. Yet, the prevailing mindset and approach to homeland security has been primarily from a position of response. Millions of dollars and even greater amounts of time have been spent on

response-oriented activities such as purchasing equipment and conducting response-oriented training exercises. Even our national strategies focus primarily on response. Those who practice response argue that America has an enormous need to improve emergency response procedures. They point to the problems first-responders experienced in New York City when the World Trade Towers were attacked in 2001 and to the problems encountered in Louisiana after hurricane Katrina struck. While there is no doubt effective response strategies save lives, it is plainly evident that effective prevention strategies save even more lives.

Nevertheless, as a country we continue to focus on response. In June 2004, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security stated, “The Committee is concerned that DHS agencies are not placing top priority on their homeland security missions set forth in the Homeland Security Act, but are in some cases giving more weight to less urgent, legacy activities.”<sup>73</sup>

Our country has always been response-oriented. One reason for our national tunnel vision is that response is much easier to evaluate than prevention. It is also big business for companies to sell response-oriented equipment and training materials. Dr. Christopher Bellavita, of the Naval Postgraduate School observed, “We have been at this longer than WWII, and we still do not have a cohesive – or articulated – national prevention strategy. Something is wrong.”<sup>74</sup> Yes, something is wrong, but there is hope.

Municipal Homeland Security Programs are designed to shift our national thought process from response to prevention. In fact, the entire MHSS strategy is designed with prevention as its main objective. Through a municipal homeland security program, MHSOs and CHSOs have the responsibility to develop their community’s prevention plan. The plan is tailored to their city or town and designed with that community’s unique vulnerabilities in mind. MHSOs and CHSOs don’t write the community prevention plan on their own; rather, it’s a collaborative effort, incorporating input from community stakeholders, business and infrastructure managers, emergency planners,

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<sup>73</sup> House Appropriations Subcommittee.

<sup>74</sup> Christopher Bellavita, “What is Preventing Homeland Security?” *Homeland Security Affairs* I, no. 1, art. 3 (Summer 2005).

facility security officers, government officials, school and fire department personnel, and anyone else so identified. The prevention plan includes all aspects of terrorism prevention and can even go so far as addressing the location and construction of new bomb-resistant public (or private) buildings. The plan addresses and develops preventive countermeasures for potential targets such as high-rise apartment buildings, hazardous material storage and transports, critical infrastructures, school graduations, concerts, sporting events, festivals, holiday celebrations, and any other community vulnerability.

By developing community prevention plans (in addition to response plans), we are taking important first steps toward the adoption of new philosophy. This new, 21<sup>st</sup> century philosophy centers on preventing and circumventing terrorism, not mainly on responding after it occurs. Municipal Homeland Security Programs force people – an entire community - to change their thinking from response to prevention.

### **3. Investigation Component**

The investigation component consists of two sub-sections: preliminary investigation and follow-up investigations. When a municipal police department operates a MHSP, the MHSO has the responsibility to conduct the preliminary (homeland security-related) investigation whenever possible. The follow-up investigation must always be conducted by the MHSO. By restricting suspicious activity and terrorism-related cases to MHSOs, we find that case information is centralized, analyzed and processed through a more detailed and efficient investigative process. In addition, as MHSOs conduct homeland security-related investigations, they become increasingly educated in the domestic security field. Subsequently, a cadre of experienced homeland security investigators is created at the municipal level, and the force multiplies.

Today, when a police department receives information that a suspicious incident is taking place at an important facility, the standard response is to dispatch the nearest patrol officer. This officer typically assumes full responsibility for conducting the entire preliminary investigation. He or she usually has little or no anti-terrorism training and is not familiar with the unique characteristics, or site familiarity, of the facility. This lack of training correlates into missed opportunity for the police department (and broader

America) to detect terrorism and protect their community. Vital information is not collected that might have proven central to a terrorism investigation. Officers who are not trained in terrorism investigation are not typically capable of identifying behaviors, patterns, events and indicators that are possibly related to terrorism.

To make matters worse, when a police officer collects information at a suspicious incident, the information is usually recorded on that department's standardized form, reviewed by a superior officer (possibly), and then eventually filled among thousands of other police reports. This information will remain in the department's computer database (or filing cabinet) without ever being separated, categorized, analyzed, or otherwise processed. Reports like these become "lost in the matrix" and do not help America's homeland security efforts.

Under the municipal homeland security strategy model, however, an MHSO responds to the scene and investigates suspicious incidents as they unfold. He or she assumes full responsibility for the preliminary and follow-up investigations. Case information is centrally located in a Department of Homeland Security-linked computer. Suspicious activity reports are completed on standardized MHSS forms and submitted in a nationally standardized format and timeline. (Initial reports, either completed or incomplete, are submitted within 24 hours of the incident being reported to a MHSO.) Local and state law enforcement agencies – the MHSPs – use exactly the same forms for terrorism-related reports and submit these to the Department of Homeland Security, Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), and the nearest fusion center via a secure computer network. These reports can be viewed by anyone authorized to access the network. State fusion centers, intelligence agencies, federal agencies and every municipal homeland security officer will have immediate access to the information.

None of this can happen if police departments do not begin designating officers as municipal homeland security officers. There continues to be widespread resistance on behalf of the municipal police community in this critical area. Many police executives completely ignore the reorganization of the federal government to create the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI's significant mission realignment toward counterterrorism. These police executives either refuse or fail to recognize the significant

role a local terrorism specialist can play in a community's security. This is surprising, especially when the law enforcement profession has typically agreed that specialists are far more effective at investigating specific crimes than conventional patrol officers. In fact, nearly every police department in America has some type of specialist among its ranks. There are narcotic officers, sexual assault investigators, accident reconstructionists, anti-drug officers, school resources officers, and so forth. Yet, few departments have terrorism specialists. The municipal police profession is clearly lagging behind in this regard.

One highly trained terrorism specialist is a more thorough investigator than an entire department of non-trained generalists. Specialization in homeland security will greatly enhance both preliminary and follow-up investigations because the investigator is trained in terrorism-related topics such as explosive recognition, surveillance techniques and technologies, foreign name recognition, fraudulent documents, immigration procedures, foreign terrorist organizations and their tactics, domestic terrorist groups, world geography, foreign cultures and religious customs. This training correlates into increased opportunities for detection. Better quality investigations combined with increased standardization facilitates early detection efforts. And, early detection is the hallmark of prevention.

### **C. GOVERNING STRUCTURE**

In the United States, there are a number of task forces at the municipal level addressing a spectrum of issues. There are drug, auto, gang, and violent crime task forces, many funded by the federal government and comprised of police officers and agents from multiple law enforcement, intelligence and homeland security-related agencies. Task force members meet regularly to plan strategy, conduct training, exchange ideas and perform mission-related business. The task force concept is not new to the American law enforcement community.

Administratively, each municipality's MHSP and the MHSN is governed by three individuals: the state's director of homeland security, the police chief of that jurisdiction (MHSP only) and the district attorney for the region. These three individuals work

collaboratively to ensure the MHSP accomplishes its stated mission, meets federal and state standards, and operates within the boundaries of federal and state laws as well as Department of Homeland Security guidelines. The chief of police meets regularly with the district attorney to discuss state and local laws, crimes that support terrorism and collection initiatives.

MHSPs operate in the same manner as a task force. In the case of the MHSN, the police department with the greatest amount of critical infrastructure within the MHSN's jurisdiction will take on the administrative duties for the network. This department serves as the lead agency for the MHSN's administration and is responsible for coordination, equipment purchases, grant applications and overall operation of the MHSN.

The local district attorney provides criminal law-related guidance to MHSPs and members of the MHSN, while the state's director of homeland security serves as the MHSN's governing authority and has final approval and supervisory control over the activities of a MHSP and MHSN. The MHSN's administrative authority (the aforementioned police department) is responsible for submitting the MHSN's Regional Intelligence Plan (RIP) and Regional Technology Plan (RTP) for the network. These plans are submitted to the director of homeland security for approval. This ensures the director knows exactly what intelligence efforts are occurring in his or her state.

Instead of being funded by state monies, MHSNs request and receive funding directly from the Department of Homeland Security. Funding requests are constructed upon the same criteria the Department of Homeland Security uses in its Homeland Security Grant Program, which are "...risk-based analysis and regional security cooperation."<sup>75</sup> Most importantly, funding is based on demonstrated need, not political wrangling. Every MHSN will be required to articulate how homeland security funds will be spent and how the technologies purchased will help to secure the MHSN jurisdiction from terrorists, the crimes that support terrorism, and terrorism-related suspicious activities.

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<sup>75</sup> Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Grant Program Guidelines, 3.

## **D. CHAPTER SUMMARY**

In 1776, Benjamin Franklin said “We must all hang together, or most assuredly we shall all hang separately.”<sup>76</sup> These words have as much meaning for today’s homeland security community as they did hundreds of years ago for our founding fathers. Individual effort at any level of government or discipline has no place in America’s homeland security strategy. In similar fashion to the efforts put forth by our founding fathers, America’s homeland security community must stand united, work synergistically, and build comprehensive HLS policy. This can best be accomplished through the implementation of strategy that creates unified action; the MHSS creates unity.

The MHSS is designed with a single purpose – to protect the American homeland. This strategy integrates resources, community members, technologies and prevention strategies into a collaborative homeland security network that is dedicated to protecting the homeland at the community and regional level. The three components – awareness, prevention and investigation – serve to focus the efforts of MHSOs, CHSOs and other HLS personnel as they go about the responsibility of preventing terrorism and securing their communities from catastrophic accident.

The MHSS is flexible enough to allow for variances in community size, complexity, personnel, equipment and technologies. Yet, the strategy offers the right amount of standardization to create uniformity across regions and states – even the country. Every MHSP will be similarly designed, but each will possess the unique characteristics of its specific community. This “adaptability” enables police agencies of all sizes to work together and benefit from each other as never before. For example, police agencies that cannot afford to assign a staff member to a federal task force are now able to participate in regional HLS networks (MHSNs) and thereby, receive the same information and intelligence task force members receive. (MHSN members receive security clearances.)

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<sup>76</sup> Principles of Freedom, <http://research.history.org/pf/signers/> (accessed November 17, 2008).

The lessons our founding fathers learned relative to the unity of effort, economy of force and force multiplication must be applied to HLS strategy. If we fail to apply these lessons, America will likely suffer additional terror attacks, and regretfully, we may suffer the gravest attack of all – a nuclear attack on American soil. Unsynchronized individual effort cannot effectively address every aspect of homeland security; we must have unity if we are to effectively protect our citizens. The MHSS is the only option that creates and fosters unity. United we survive.

## **VII. HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICERS (MHSOS) AND (CHSOS)**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The officers assigned to a municipal homeland security program are designated as municipal homeland security officers (MHSOs) and community homeland security officers (CHSOs). Municipalities will have (at least) one full-time or part-time MHSO and at least one part-time CHSO. Preferably, most police departments will appoint (as a minimum) one full-time MHSO. However, in some instances this may not be possible. Some departments do not have the personnel to dedicate one officer as a full-time homeland security specialist. In these situations, a part-time MHSO appointment is necessary. The intention is that every police department appoints at least one MHSO. Certainly, every department can appoint one officer to serve as a part-time MHSO without incurring a significantly negative impact on the department.

Municipalities also appoint at least one member of a community's administration as a community homeland security officer (CHSO). This civilian asset works collaboratively with the MHSO on community-oriented homeland security matters. The CHSO serves as a bridge between the municipality's administration and the MHSP's security efforts.

### **B. MUNICIPAL HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICERS (MHSOS)**

Municipal homeland security officers have enormous responsibilities. They are much more than terrorism or suspicious incident investigators. They become a community's point of contact for all matters related to homeland security. These officers specialize in terrorism prevention, awareness and investigation. They serve as a department's point of contact for the federal and state government, military, and intelligence communities as they receive, disseminate and exchange homeland security-related information. They receive security clearances and supplement the JTTF, ATAC

and other federal and state homeland security investigations as required. MHSOs are force multipliers for America's current homeland security and anti-terrorism federal and state agents.

MHSOs proactively identify and eliminate community vulnerabilities, protect vital infrastructures from attack, conduct public and private awareness training, and become that expert on everything from transnational terrorist organizations to school prevention plans. Their mission is to protect their community from terrorists and other like-minded individuals. They are dedicated to a single community, organized regionally and guided by a single purpose – to protect their community from terrorism and the crimes that support terrorism. These officers form a collaborative network of homeland security-first preventors, investigators and responders – the MHSN – dedicated solely to that region.

In addition, MHSOs have the following responsibilities.

- To lead the municipal homeland security program's efforts to protect the community from terrorism and catastrophic accident
- To identify community vulnerabilities and implement solutions to those vulnerabilities. This includes working with and learning infrastructure operational practices, procedures and employees. This is the primary responsibility of MHSOs.
- To work collaboratively with the CHSO and design community safe projects that take into account security measures and homeland security issues
- To ensure the proactive and timely identification, collection, processing and dissemination of homeland security and terrorism-related information and intelligence. (Intelligence Function)
- To design systematic methodologies that identifies potential homeland security information. Reviewing local marriage certificates for fraudulent marriages is one example where municipal homeland security officers can use public source information to detect potential terrorism information.
- To establish and maintain lines of communication with federal and state homeland security and terrorism entities. (Relationship Building)
- To conduct vulnerability and risk assessments for critical infrastructure, sensitive facilities, and community assets. (Target Hardening)
- To develop school security plans and coordinate emergency drills. (Community Safety)

- To develop and conduct community terrorism-awareness training sessions with residents, school personnel, businesses and other community stakeholders. (Terrorism Awareness)
- To supplement federal and state anti-terrorism task forces as necessary. (Force Multiplier)
- To supplement the efforts of Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers as necessary. (Force Multiplier)
- To supplement the efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard as necessary. (Force Multiplier)
- To attend and conduct homeland security and anti-terrorism training sessions. (Economized Training)
- To serve as a department's homeland security trainer by passing on newly learned skills and information to other members of his or her department. (Economized Training)
- To conduct site familiarity training at schools and critical infrastructure for patrol officers and other first-responders in the community. (Community and Officer Safety)
- To maintain the department's homeland security database and related intelligence. (Intelligence Function)
- To be responsible for all homeland security grant and funding requests. (Financial Function)

Municipal homeland security officers are much more than terrorism investigators or information points-of-contact. They are a community's homeland security experts. Their responsibilities span the entire spectrum of homeland security and terrorism duties, and they are a local community's immediate protection against terrorism and catastrophic accidents. They are the nation's primary source of intelligence identifiers, collectors and disseminators as they fulfill their responsibility of protecting the citizenry through the establishment of collaborative homeland security partnerships. MHSOs are the community policing officers of the future.

### **C. COMMUNITY HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICERS (CHSOS)**

Protecting a community from terrorism and catastrophic accident is too cumbersome a task for just one person, therefore the MHSS is built upon a collaborative framework that integrates all homeland security assets into the strategy. A key

component of the strategy is local government. Through the MHSS design, mayors and administrators are incorporated into the strategy at the MHSP level. The strategy calls upon each municipality to appoint at least one person from the administration's staff as a community homeland security officer (CHSO.)

The CHSO is the administration's point-of contact to the MHSP and other federal and state homeland security entities. The CHSO is able to provide the MHSP a government based perspective that is able to utilize the influences and authority available to local government.

For example, CHSOs ensure that new high-profile construction projects take into account issues such as security, protective and evacuation measures in project design. Blast resistant building materials, security lighting, parking lot design, evacuation considerations, dual-use buildings and many other homeland security-related issues can be brought to the table by CHSOs.

CHSOs and MHSOs work collaboratively with businesses to curtail dangerous business practices from occurring in the community. Practices such as driving liquefied natural gas (LNG) trucks on city streets while school children are bused is just one example where a CHSO and MHSOs can collaboratively to secure the community. In some instances, private business may not be willing to curtail a particular business practice upon the request of a MHSO. This is where the CHSO can work with a business and offer tax concessions or other incentives to gain the business' compliance.

Another area where the CHSO can have positive effect on the MHSP is in the area of funding. A number of federal and state funding issues can be researched and addressed at the administration level. Building projects, highway and road developments, emergency shelters and power concerns are all issues that directly affect the citizenry and are often best addressed through local government channels.

#### **D. CHAPTER SUMMARY**

The MHSS creates two community-level homeland security positions (MHSOs and CHSOs) and tasks these individuals with the responsibility of securing the community from terrorism and catastrophic accident. These officers are committed to creating innovative protection methodologies that secure a community's infrastructure, public buildings, private businesses, schools, high-rise apartment buildings, ports, railways, major events, hospitals, roadways and neighborhoods. These officers are focused on prevention, not response, as they provide municipal homeland security.

MHSOs and CHSOs combine their unique abilities and resources to ensure that every possible asset is utilized to construct a comprehensive protection plan for their communities. MHSOs are the community policing officers of the future and CHSOs are the political arm of municipal homeland security that ensures local communities have voices in the political spectrum.

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## **VIII. MUNICIPAL HOMELAND SECURITY NETWORK (MHSN)**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

Once appointed, MHSOs are organized into collaborative, regionally-based intelligence networks dedicated to serving not only a specific community, but entire geographic regions. These networks are called Municipal Homeland Security Networks (MHSNs). They are constructed with a flat organizational design that considers each member to be an equal and valued partner. The size and composition of each network will vary according to the number of police departments and resources within a particular region.

MHSNs are comprised of MHSOs, federal agents, state police officers, intelligence and military personnel, fire and health officials, and select community members - such as managers of critical infrastructures. These individuals work collaboratively, at the local level, to secure their region against terrorism and the crimes that support terrorism.

The purpose of the MHSN is to accomplish much more than just share information, its purpose is to regionalize homeland security intelligence efforts. The network facilitates the efficient sharing of information, intelligence, case materials, ideas, prevention strategies, and technologies across regions. The 9/11 Commission noted the following in its final report: “We propose that information be shared horizontally, across new networks that transcend individual agencies.”<sup>77</sup> LHSNs accomplish this objective; they share information while remaining open to any agency that can contribute positively. These networks are based on the local district attorney’s jurisdiction and dedicated to homeland security and terrorism-related criminal intelligence matters. They do not address non-homeland security-related crimes. By integrating the local district attorney’s

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<sup>77</sup> 9/11 Commission Report, 418.


office into the strategy, MHSNs unify the criminal intelligence efforts of entire jurisdictions and incorporate the prosecutorial arm of local government into the fight against terrorism.

As information, intelligence, case materials, ideas and prevention strategies are exchanged via the network, efficiency increases, as does America's ability to protect herself. Through these collaborative, preventative-based networks, the knowledge of one agency becomes the knowledge of all agencies. All this is accomplished at a minimum expense to individual police departments.

Even MHSO training sessions will take place through the network. The Department of Homeland Security – or any other federal entity – can quickly and efficiently conduct terrorism or security-related training sessions with network personnel. Entire geographic areas can be brought-up-to-speed on intelligence matters, terrorism trends or other homeland security issues.

## Municipal Homeland Security Network (MHSN)

### Typical Representation



The Municipal Homeland Security Network mirrors the jurisdiction of the local district attorney and will vary in size and complexity. Some MHSNs will be comprised of numerous MHSOs, federal agents, and other civilian participants, and therefore, will be larger and more complex.

Figure 9. A Synergistic Approach to Homeland Security

Municipal homeland security networks create collaborative partnerships where trained homeland security professionals (MHSOs) meet, exchange ideas, work together and develop region-wide preventative plans and intelligence priorities. Once established, MHSNs become the central component of this nation's domestic intelligence collection and homeland security strategy.

The MHSN meets at least monthly to discuss information and intelligence collected within the participating communities of the network. Along with MHSNs, federal agents, state police officers assigned to homeland security, U.S. Attorney and fusion center personnel attend the meetings and provide homeland security-related

information that originated somewhere outside the network's collective jurisdiction. This ensures that trends and indicators garnered from the national or international areas are transferred to municipal networks.

In addition, network personnel come together to discuss ways there are protecting their individual communities. This way each MHSO learns from the other. For example, one community may identify a vulnerability to its water supply, which in turn prompts the next community to investigate its water supply security further. Federal agents and fusion center analysts learn from the experiences of MHSOs and then relay that information to others outside the network. This caliber of exchange does not take place in a virtual community or through an e-mail list to an "anti-terrorism" point of contact, as is the practice with the TLO Program.

Municipal homeland security networks:

- Serve as this nation's primary domestic information and intelligence network. The MHSN is organized regionally and works to secure not only a single municipality, but entire regions.
- Proactively identify community and regional vulnerabilities and develop plans to address those vulnerabilities. Proactive prevention is the mantra of MHSNs – not response.
- Proactively identify, collect, analyze and disseminate homeland security and terrorism-related information and intelligence.
- Ensure intelligence is processed through the intelligence cycle in a timely manner.
- Ensure that suspicious incident and terrorism-related data is disseminated across the entire region, state and country.
- Develop Regional Intelligence Plans (RTPs). Regional intelligence plans describe the intelligence priorities for a specific region and focus the intelligence efforts of the MHSN.
- Assist in developing risk and vulnerability assessments and security plans for critical infrastructure.
- Provide outreach partners for fusion center personnel. Fusion centers send staff personnel (especially analysts) to attend MHSN meetings.

- Develop strategies that address terrorism and crimes that support terrorism. Along with the local district attorney, crimes that support terrorism are addressed on a regional level.
- Facilitate federal and state-level intelligence and terrorism cases. Federal and state agencies utilize the MHSNs to collect, receive and disseminate information and intelligence.
- Develop and implement community and regional terrorism-awareness campaigns.
- Receive and provide homeland-security training.
- Meet at least once each month or more often if necessary.

Municipal homeland security networks do not:

- Address regional emergency response or all hazard issues. Response is left to emergency responders and other emergency service agencies.
- Analyze homeland security or intelligence information. Analyzing information is the responsibility of the supporting fusion center. MHSNs review, share and disseminate collected information – they are not analysis networks.
- Operate independently from the supporting fusion center. MHSN and fusion center personnel work collaboratively to identify regional intelligence priorities. The supporting fusion center is considered a key component of the Network.

In America, there is no strategy or program that proposes such a municipality-based intelligence entity. In 1996, the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department in California created a similar intelligence entity entitled Terrorism Early Warning Groups (TEWGs). These entities operated on "six integrated cells that create a system for processing incoming data through analysis by each of the cells, then synthesis of their individual evaluation to form an overall picture"<sup>78</sup> The primary problem with TEWGs is that they operated as regional fusion centers staffed with members of different law enforcement agencies. Individual municipal police agencies do not have the staffing or funding to support a complex analysis center. Personnel, computers and a host of other expenses are associated with intelligence fusion centers, these cost are too prohibitive for municipal police agencies. In addition, the TEWG design is more akin to fusing information than

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<sup>78</sup> Michael Grossman, *Perception or Fact: Measuring the Effectiveness of the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group* (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2005).

serving as a region's domestic intelligence collection and dissemination agency. Subsequently, the state of California has not adopted and broadened the TEWG concept state wide. Instead, California now funds Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers (RTTACs) and State Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers (STTACs).

## **B. REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PLANS**

Every municipal homeland security network produces and implements a Regional Intelligence Plan (RIP) and a Regional Technology Plan (RTP). These documents focus and guide the collective efforts of municipal homeland security officers and other network participants by identifying the intelligence priorities and the technological needs of a MHSN.

These two documents are not devised by any one member of the MHSN, or by a particular homeland security entity, but rather by the collective efforts of the entire MHSN. No two regional intelligence and technology plans will be exactly alike. Each plan takes into account a jurisdiction's particular vulnerabilities, infrastructure, population, business composition, criminal activity and proximity to adjacent vulnerabilities. Each plan also examines the suspicious and homeland security-related incidents reported within or adjacent to the MHSN's jurisdiction. These documents are revised and updated according to the information and intelligence the MHSN receives and collects. Any federal, state or local entity or person can contribute information or intelligence to the MHSN. MHSNs are horizontal in both design and function – and truly collaborative.

The Department of Homeland Security – or other homeland security, intelligence or military entity – can issue mass bulletins (classified and non-classified) to every MHSN across the country, or bulletins can be restricted to a specific MHSN. Instead of bulletins being sent to a police department (a building) – where few people are likely to see or hear about a bulletin's contents – bulletins are sent to people (MHSOs) who are in the position to immediately act upon the information provided. Through the MHSN, information is exchanged in an extremely timely and efficient manner.

## **1. Regional Information Plans (RIPs)**

In the United States, there is no formal domestic intelligence methodology constructed with a bottom-up approach to intelligence collection. Municipal police departments perform homeland security, terrorism and suspicious incident information and intelligence collection in a haphazard, serendipitous manner that is inconsistent, counterproductive and detrimental to the overall intelligence function. Simply stated, there is no systematic, collaborative or comprehensive method to collect homeland security-related intelligence in America today.

Mark Lowenthal, author of *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, states, “Collection is the bedrock of intelligence”<sup>79</sup> and “Without collection, intelligence is little more than guesswork - perhaps educated guesswork, but guesswork nonetheless.”<sup>80</sup> Municipal homeland security networks and the regional intelligence plans they develop are designed to take the guesswork out of domestic intelligence collection. Regional intelligence plans articulate the specific objectives and priorities of a network’s intelligence collection strategy. MHSOs decide together, and sometimes are advised, what information and intelligence to look for, when to look for it, and in many circumstances, how to look for it.

Essentially, regional intelligence plans are designed to guide the collective efforts of a MHSN. As a MHSN receives or collects information and intelligence, members of the MHSN review the data (along with members of the nearest fusion center), determine its utility to their region, and then collectively build and implement a regional intelligence plan. The supporting fusion center conducts a full analysis of the data. The intelligence priorities for a particular region are collectively designed, fused with other pieces of information and intelligence, and then distributed across the entire network.

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<sup>79</sup> Mark Lowenthal, *Intelligence* (CQ Press, Washington, D.C., 2006), 68.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 68.

Information and intelligence travels upon pre-established lines of communication, is shared with every member of the network, and every department in the MHSN receives exactly the same information and intelligence. This ensures that every police department within the network is on equal footing and completely aware of what is transpiring within its geographical area.

One MHSN may decide to concentrate its collective efforts on suspicious incidents in the maritime arena, while another may concentrate on crimes that support terrorism. In these examples, the intelligence plan is different for each region as it addresses the particular needs of that network – but all plans support domestic intelligence collection.

## **2 Regional Technology Plans (RTPs)**

Regional technology plans are designed to assist municipal homeland security networks to identify, purchase, distribute, manage and implement homeland security technologies. Each RTP is specifically designed for a particular region and therefore must focus on that region's unique vulnerabilities. RTPs are interoperable with neighboring RTPs, offering an element of redundancy to a region's security as technologies are shared among MHSPs.

Because technological advances take place so quickly, regional technology plans focus on applications rather than technologies. "In other words, make your technology plan outcome-based, not input-based. Develop a plan that specifies what police officers, staff, and administration should be able to do with the technology and let those outcomes determine the types and amount of technology your plan requests."<sup>81</sup> Regional technology plans are outcome based, focusing on preventing, detecting and investigating terrorism. Therefore, in most instances, police departments in the network will not receive the same technologies. One MHSP may have a need for a sensor network while another MHSP requires surveillance cameras. Rarely will every police department in the network receive the same equipment – except in the area of communication. By focusing

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<sup>81</sup> John See, <http://nctp.com/john.see.html> (accessed November 17, 2008).

on outcomes we maintain alignment between technology and the network's mission. "But we want it done in such a way that the dollars are distributed according to a plan. We have 18,000 municipalities in the United States. We've got 3,000 counties and parishes, 50 states and four territories. And if everybody goes charging out to the Congress in Washington, D.C. and says, give us a little money, we want to do this, this and that, we will not have a seamless national system. We have to build basic capacity around this country."<sup>82</sup> RTPs build capacity across entire regions, while maximizing technological and human resources.

### **3. Developing Regional Technology Plans**

The first step toward developing a regional technology plan is to identify the vulnerabilities in each community within the MHSN's region. This is accomplished when MHSOs go into their communities and meet with community stakeholders such as managers of critical infrastructures, hospital and school administrators, power and gas company representatives, building managers and state officials.

Together, MHSOs and community stakeholders form "assessment teams" as they conduct security and risk-based assessments of their community's infrastructure and sensitive facilities. Assessment teams are comprised of the facility's top administrator, selected facility personnel (both management and general staff), and state and city officials. Anyone who has knowledge of a particular facility, procedure or process should be included. The purpose is to conduct a team assessment of the facility, identify vulnerabilities, and then prioritize those vulnerabilities. Once the vulnerabilities are prioritized, the assessment team then determines which vulnerabilities can be corrected by non-technical measures and which vulnerabilities will require the application of technologies from outside the facility. Some vulnerability can be corrected without technological intervention; a modification to a facility's policy or operating procedures is

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<sup>82</sup> Remarks By Homeland Security Director Thomas Ridge to Pennsylvania First Responders, January 3, 2003, [http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech\\_0080.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0080.shtm) (December 16, 2008).

often all that is required. In order for the RTP to be effective, every MHSO in the network must conduct security and risk-based assessments in his or her community. Without this foundational effort, RTPs cannot effectively manage technology.

Once the MHSOs have prioritized their community's particular vulnerabilities those findings are brought before the MHSN. As a group, the MHSN prioritizes the jurisdiction's vulnerabilities and determines which vulnerabilities must be immediately addressed by the network. Network members then work together and determine which technologies will eliminate or seriously reduce the most critical vulnerabilities. The MHSN then submits a grant application to the Department of Homeland Security or their respective state agency.

### **C. CHAPTER SUMMARY**

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states, "A government has no higher obligation than to protect the lives and livelihoods of its citizens." <sup>83</sup> I assert that municipal police departments have no higher obligation. But how does the municipal law enforcement community meet this important obligation if there is no municipal level entity responsible for identifying community vulnerabilities and actively collecting homeland security-related information? Besides a few part-time terrorism liaison officers, the majority of municipal police agencies in America do not have anyone assigned to this important function.

How can we find transnational and domestic terrorists in our communities if there is no systematic strategy to locate them? Are Americans relying on municipal police to find something they are not even looking for? The continued reliance on serendipitous, chance encounters is dangerous and not effective at fulfilling America's intelligence needs. To compound this problem, fusion centers are receiving the majority of information and intelligence from federal agencies. This top-down "feeding tube"

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<sup>83</sup> The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.

approach to domestic intelligence serves only to accentuate the federal intelligence system. Essentially, fusion centers have become extended components of the federal government.

The municipal homeland security network corrects these national and state wrongs by creating regionally organized networks of dedicated homeland security experts at the local level. In the MHSN, domestic intelligence collection is decidedly flat in design and non-hierarchical. Through this approach, all of America's homeland security assets collaborate and work together with a common purpose. Presently, no other national, state or local strategy facilitates such collaboration.

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## **IX. STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION AND CONCLUSION**

### **A. STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION**

Municipal homeland security and the strategies described in this paper are new to many in America. Whenever a new strategy, idea or concept is introduced it is likely to receive some level of pushback, especially when the strategy encompasses an entire profession – or, as in this case, an entire level of law enforcement. There will always be those who oppose a new idea and prefer to cling to familiar ways. Usually, people in this category remain firm in their beliefs until they fully understand (or are shown) the importance of the new idea and the significant effect it has on their world. When aircraft carriers were first introduced, many in the Navy believed they were wasteful and unnecessary. Today, nearly everyone recognizes the significant role aircraft carriers have played in world history.

During the strategic planning process, strategy formulators must identify strategic challenges and potential obstacles. In the realm of municipal homeland security, there are three primary challenges that demand our attention: (1) the entrenched beliefs of the police culture and the continued unwillingness of the municipal law enforcement community to adopt homeland security as a core mission; (2) the declining financial environment at the municipal level; and (3) the distinct lack of homeland security-related guidance from the federal government to municipal police agencies.

By identifying the potential challenges a strategy is likely to confront, we are able to construct strategy implementation measures that either mitigate or dissolve these impediments before we reach a critical juncture in the implementation process. By preparing in this fashion, we increase our chances of success while simultaneously reduce the likelihood of failure. Essentially, we manage the issues before the issues manage us. The identification of strategic challenges is a vital component of strategic planning.

Implementation of the municipal homeland security strategy (MHSS) begins with a direct assault on the ruinous falsehood that homeland security is not a core municipal police mission. Municipal police executives must be shown how their communities' – and broader America's – security is directly linked to the level of municipal police involvement in this nation's homeland security efforts. One method of accomplishing this task is to educate police executives on the emerging and dynamic aspects of terrorism. Professional organizations such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Police Executive Research Forum can facilitate this change. Understanding terrorism is the first step toward preventing it.

The federal government can influence municipal police culture and reduce false perceptions by incorporating more municipal police officers into federal-level terrorism investigations. We must not restrict the involvement of the municipal law enforcement community in America's terrorism investigations to those few municipal officers who are assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Forces.

One method of increasing municipal police involvement in federal investigations is through the utilization of MHSOs. Federal agencies must consider MHSOs as force multipliers and utilize these homeland security assets more often to help investigate terrorism leads and cases.

Another method to ensure that federal, state and local police agencies operate on the same intelligence continuum is to incorporate the municipal law enforcement community (as collectors) into America's intelligence community. This can best be accomplished through the routine utilization of MHSOs and MHSNs by federal agencies.

Strategy implementation can also be facilitated by providing the municipal law enforcement community with specific homeland security-related expectations. Police executives must know how their agencies are expected to integrate into federal and state homeland security strategy. They must know specifically what is expected of them in the areas of homeland security, counterterrorism and intelligence collection. The expectations must be measurable, realistic and widely recognized. Today, the majority of police executives do not know what homeland security role to fulfill. Not knowing the

standard reinforces the status quo and fosters increased inaction. In turn, inaction reinforces the status quo. As the cycle repeats itself, the nation becomes more vulnerable.

In his book, *Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement*, John Bryson asserts there are “general guidelines”<sup>84</sup> for strategy implementation.

According to Bryson, the first step is to “Consciously and deliberately plan and manage implementation in a strategic way.”<sup>85</sup> Here, strategic planning is the key to implementation. Strategy implementers must plan how a strategy will be implemented. “Implementation therefore must be explicitly considered prior to the implementation step, as a way of minimizing later implementation difficulties, and it must be explicitly considered and planned for during the implementation step itself.”<sup>86</sup>

Relative to the MHSN strategy, implementation strategies must be collaboratively designed by all stakeholders: federal, state and local government representatives, law enforcement executives from all levels, political leaders, and members of professional organizations such as the IACP and PERF. By incorporating key stakeholders buy-in is fostered across the widest possible participant spectrum. Once buy-in is achieved, implementation will proceed more flawlessly.

Next, Bryson states that “implementation strategy documents and action plans”<sup>87</sup> should be utilized to guide the implementation process. In this regard, strategy implementers must ensure that specific implementation steps are clearly articulated to all participants. There must be schedules, timelines, implementation milestones and other measuring instruments that catalog the implementation process.

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<sup>84</sup> John Bryson *Strategic Planning for Public and NonProfit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004).

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid

Implementation of the MHSN strategy becomes tangible when police executives name someone on staff as a municipal homeland security officer (MHSO). MHSNs cannot be formed until municipal police departments in the local district attorney's jurisdiction have someone on staff dedicated to the homeland security mission. The identification of MHSOs is a critical milestone toward strategy implementation. Another milestone is providing the MHSN with a clearly defined mission statement, performance objectives and evaluative criteria. These measures provide the contextual framework that link vision to objectives and serve as implementing strategies.

Training is a performance measure that is applied to the MHSS strategy. MHSOs must be trained in homeland security related topics such as terrorism awareness, surveillance and counter-surveillance techniques, improvised explosive device recognition, chemical detection, name recognition, immigration law and many other areas. Once MHSOs are trained by federal agencies, they in turn become trainers for their respective police departments. This training is cost efficient because it is conducted with the entire MHSN during the normal business day of MHSO. In most cases there will be no overtime associated with the training. Trainers can train an entire region of a state in one session. This approach ensures the consistency of knowledge and procedure throughout the MHSNs collective jurisdiction. One of the most beneficial aspects of training entire MHSNs at once is that MHSOs can discuss the utility of the training with other MHSOs while at the training session. This allows MHSOs to see how other jurisdictions will apply the training, plan coordination, and thereby, better secure their own jurisdiction.

Training is an effective performance measure for implementation because training can be measured and cataloged for every MHSO and MHSN. The MHSN serves as the homeland security training forum for America's domestic intelligence collectors.

Bryson also asserts that implementers should strive to first introduce changes that can be "easily and rapidly"<sup>88</sup> implemented. Accordingly, strategy implementers must first concentrate on small successes before attempting to implement more substantive

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<sup>88</sup> John Bryson, *Strategic Planning for Public and NonProfit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004).

changes. By introducing the strategy in increments, rather than en masse, acceptance of the MHSS is less abrupt to the municipal police community. Instead, of being perceived as a federal directive, the strategy is seen as a ground-up approach to protect the local community.

Therefore, the first success MHSS implementers should strive to achieve is the creation of a nation-wide support base for the strategy. Implementers must seek out those police leaders who support the homeland security mission and have created their own homeland security programs. Contained within these two groups is the largest pre-existing and untapped assemblage of strategy support. This support must first be mined; then it must be converted into a support-building mechanism that further expands the support base. As support for the strategy grows, implementers focus on achieving more significant successes and solidifying the implementation process.

Creating buy-in with local district attorneys is another strategy goal. Many local district attorneys are elected officials. As an elected official, district attorneys are always looking for new techniques to help them apprehend criminals, protect citizens, and reduce fear in the community. The MHSS accomplishes all of these goals. In addition, the MHSS places the local district attorney in a key leadership position in the network; always a good position to be in – especially if you are a politician.

Once buy-in is created with police executives and district attorneys, MHSOs will be appointed in the majority of police departments. Subsequently, MHSNs will form. As MHSNs form, information, intelligence and ideas are readily exchanged; relationships build and collaborative partnerships develop; municipal police departments will be incorporated into the intelligence cycle; and MHSN members will begin to work as a team.

As the popularity and importance of the MHSS becomes nationally recognized, the federal government should restructure homeland security funding procedures to mandate MHSN development. Regionalization is already a federal requirement for homeland security grant requests. The MHSS builds upon the regionalization concept by encouraging law enforcement, homeland security, intelligence, military and civilian

entities to participate in collaborative networks. The MHSS is the only homeland security and intelligence collection strategy that brings all of America's homeland security assets together at the local level.

The MHSS will not be implemented without experiencing pushback, strategic challenges and political pressures from those who have their own agendas. However, the implementation process can be made simpler if support for the strategy is garnered at the outset from the municipal law enforcement community and other key participants. Presently, in the United States, there is no nationally recognized intelligence collection strategy that integrates the municipal law enforcement community into the intelligence community like the MHSS. Therefore, vetting the strategy across homeland security disciplines and building a support base for the strategy is critically important to implementation success. Yes, the municipal police community is looking for direction from the federal government, but it's not looking for a federally mandated strategy that removes operational control from the municipal level. Therefore, the best chance of implementation success comes from building a wide base of support while simultaneously integrating the law enforcement community into America's domestic security and intelligence communities.

## **B. CONCLUSION**

Instead of facing a few very dangerous adversaries, the United States confronts a number of less visible challenges that surpass the boundaries of traditional nation-states and call for quick, imaginative, and agile responses.<sup>89</sup>

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states, "A government has no higher obligation than to protect the lives and livelihoods of its citizens."<sup>90</sup> I assert that municipal police departments have no higher obligation. The municipal homeland security strategy helps both the federal government and municipal police leaders protect the local community from those who want to destroy it. Municipal homeland security

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<sup>89</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Acts Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004).

<sup>90</sup> The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.

should be mission one for all police executives, state governments, professional law enforcement agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security. All other missions, for any of these entities, may be meaningful, but they are peripheral.

Our current approach to homeland security is effective at addressing easily identifiable terrorist organizations, but ineffective at addressing emerging threats such as asymmetric transnational or domestic threats. Terrorism is continuously evolving; therefore we must evolve at a faster rate, or we expose ourselves to unimaginable dangers. Yesterday is different from today, and so is tomorrow. Either we create a flexible and truly synergistic homeland security strategy, or we continue to rely on the status quo and hope a federal agency gathers the necessary intelligence to stop an attack before it takes place. As General Gordon Sullivan, former Chief of Staff of the Army, stated, “Hope is not a method.”<sup>91</sup> Hope is certainly not a good method, but it seems to be the method we’re operating on today.

The municipal homeland security strategy presented in this thesis is based on collaboration and prevention. It is dedicated to protecting the local community by creating partnerships with agencies and people who have a homeland security role. It is dynamic and flexible, and able to adapt to any changing or emerging threat. This strategy recognizes that municipal homeland security officers are the intelligence collectors of today, and the community policing officers of the future. Most importantly, the municipal homeland security strategy puts the onus of community protection right where it should be – at the municipal police level.

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<sup>91</sup> Gordon Sullivan and Michael Harper, *Hope is Not a Method* (New York, NY: Broadway Books, 1997).

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